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“Domestic violence is the most common cause of nonfatal injury to
women in the United States. Victims are pushed, punched, kicked,
strangled, and assaulted with various weapons with the intent of causing
pain, injury, and emotional distress.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence2 has created a massive epidemic of uncompensated
intentional torts.3 Domestic violence causes serious and widespread harms,
1. Demetrios N. Kyriacou, Deirdre Anglin, Ellen Taliaferro, Susan Stone, Toni Tubb, Judith A.
Linden, Robert Muelleman, Erik Barton, & Jess F. Kraus, Risk Factors for Injury to Women from
Domestic Violence, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1892, 1892 (1999).
2. According to one authority:
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particularly to women.4 The national scope of the problem was made plain
when Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(“VAWA”),5 which included criminal provisions, funding for services and
law enforcement, and a civil remedy provision.6 People who commit
Domestic violence is the establishment of control and fear in a relationship through the use of
physical violence, intimidation, and other forms of abuse. Legal definitions of domestic
abuse vary from state to state, but generally these definitions encompass the physical, sexual,
and/or psychological abuse of a person by someone with whom they have an intimate
relationship. Domestic abuse can come in all different forms: striking, beating, pulling hair,
shoving, pulling, punching, slapping, kicking, hitting, tripping, squeezing, choking, pushing,
biting, pulling clothes, pointing weapons, using weapons, throwing things, threatening,
harassing, stalking, intimidating, raping, abusing children, emotional abuse.
FREDRICA L. LEHRMAN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1.3, at 1–7 (1997).
Debate exists about what terms are appropriate. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN
AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 45 (2000) (noting that different terms such as “domestic violence,” “family
violence,” “spouse abuse,” or “woman abuse” reflect contrasting concepts of battering); CLARE
DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 3 (2001) (noting objections
to the term “domestic violence”). Recognizing that no single term may be ideal, this Article will use
the term “domestic violence” to refer both to “domestic violence” and to “domestic abuse” as defined
by Lehrman.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 7
(Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996) (noting that “[w]omen are far more likely than men
to be victimized by an intimate partner” and that attacks by partners are more likely to result in injury to
women than attacks by strangers); DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 4–6 (summarizing data).
There is debate about how much domestic violence is committed by men, and how much by women.
Clare Dalton’s analysis of the debate is instructive and will be followed here. Dalton notes that “more
than 90% of heterosexual partner violence reported to law-enforcement authorities is perpetrated by
men.” Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31
NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 321–22 n. 2 (1997). Statistics gleaned from reporting to law enforcement
authorities, however, do not necessarily reflect empirical reality. See id. at 322 n.2. Violence in a
battering relationship differs from other types of violence in that it is often part of a wider “coercive
strategy to subdue or control a partner.” Id. She further notes that this type of violence “appears to be
largely a male phenomenon” although not exclusively so. See id. She uses gender-specific
terminology; the male pronoun refers to person who commits domestic violence, and the female
pronoun refers to the victim, in abusive marital relationships, “in which it is indeed much more likely
that the abusive partner will be male.” Id. This practice will generally be followed in this Article; in
recognition of the fact that the abusive partner is not necessarily male, however, gender-neutral
language will at times be used.
5. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994). See infra text accompanying notes 144–49.
VAWA tried to address not just domestic violence, but violence against women generally.
6. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (codified as amended in various
sections of 8, 16, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). VAWA included a civil rights remedy provision which
allowed victims of crimes motivated by gender to sue the perpetrators. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). This
provision was struck down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
The dissent in Morrison enumerated some of the costs of domestic violence and rape. See id. at
628–35. For discussion of Morrison, see Julie Goldscheid, U.S. v. Morrison and the Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of
Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Comment: Disputing Male
Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000). The majority opinion
indicated in a footnote that the criminal remedy for interstate domestic violence contained in VAWA,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1), was constitutional. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5. VAWA also
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domestic violence generally are, in theory, liable under intentional tort
theories, in addition to whatever liability they may face under criminal
law.7 But despite the frequency with which people are injured by
“domestic violence torts,”8 very few tort suits are brought to seek recovery
for the harms domestic violence causes.9 This underenforcement is caused
by several factors. First, standard liability insurance policies generally do
not cover domestic violence torts.10 Second, many defendants have limited
or no assets. Third, statutes of limitations are typically shorter for
intentional torts than for negligence.11
A consequence of the dearth of lawsuits is that one of the key aims of
the tort system—deterrence—is failing.12
These harms are not
contained criminal provisions pertaining to stalking, 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a) (2001), and interstate
violation of protection orders, 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (2001), as well as a mandatory restitution provision, 18
U.S.C. § 2248 (2001).
7. See infra Part II.A. Applicable torts include assault, battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Archaic defenses to these tort claims, such as interspousal immunity and the marital
rape exemption, now are largely gone. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal
History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of
Interspousal Tort Immunity, 60 MONT. L. REV. 101 (1999). Between 1994 and 2000, when VAWA’s
civil rights remedy provision was struck down, a perpetrator might also have liability under that
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 13981. Not all domestic violence torts are crimes; for example, the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress creates liability for behavior that is often not criminal. See,
e.g., Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L. REV. 183,
189 n.16 (1995). The American Law Institute’s DRAFT PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS contains a brief discussion of tort claims for
“marital misconduct” which expresses skepticism about intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims.
See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 35–51 (Tentative Draft No. 2, March 14, 1996). See also infra Part II.A.
8. “Domestic violence torts” refers to torts committed as part of domestic violence. For a
definition of domestic violence, see supra note 2. Commonly applicable tort theories are battery,
assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See infra Part II.A.
9. See, e.g., Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV.
543, 565 (1992); infra Part II.B.
10. See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 101,
120; Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75
TEX. L. REV.1721, 1722–23 (1997).
11. See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part II.D.1. In many tort contexts such as negligence, the deterrence goal, as
expressed in the economic analysis of tort law, is that tort rules should lead to an optimal level of safety,
as opposed to a level of safety at which no one is injured. It is axiomatic that to prevent all accidents
would be prohibitively expensive. See, e.g., DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS
HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 197 (2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 163–67 (4th ed. 1992). In the context of intentional torts such as domestic violence torts,
however, the deterrence goal, although rarely articulated and unattainable, is that no such torts take
place. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 168–71 (1987) (explaining that defendant’s cost of avoiding harm in battery and assault
cases is negative while victim’s cost is higher and that battery and assault liability rules make economic
sense); POSNER, supra, at 210 (arguing that liability should rest on person who spits in someone else’s
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compensated through the tort system;13 the losses simply remain where
they fall.14 Second, other commonly recognized policy aims of the tort
system (such as loss spreading)15 fail in the case of domestic violence torts.
Third, because the injuries fall outside the tort system, they are less visible
face even if the well-being of the person who spits is increased more than the well-being of the person
who is spat on is diminished).
13. “Compensation” refers to tort damages that include lost wages and earning capacity, medical
expenses, compensation for property damage, as well as damages for pain and suffering and mental
distress. Compensation also refers to punitive damages, in cases of particularly egregious behavior. A
victim may have first-party insurance for medical expenses and (much less likely) may have disability
insurance. See infra notes 138–43 and accompanying text. These types of first-party insurance
partially compensate for the harm. But if there is no tort suit, compensation is not received through the
tort system; therefore, the victim will not receive pain and suffering damages, mental distress damages,
or punitive damages. From the perspective of the current tort system, such a victim does not receive
full compensation. There is considerable controversy concerning pain and suffering damages. Some
commentators believe that pain and suffering damages are appropriate and even necessary. See Martha
Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 508–10
(1998) (arguing that the individualized, nonobjective nature of pain and suffering damages is a positive
aspect of tort law); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Painand-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995); Mark Geistfield, Placing a Price
on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary
Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773 (1995). Others believe that pain and suffering damages should be
abandoned and the tort system replaced with other compensation mechanisms that would cover medical
expenses and lost wages. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY
LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESSES (1989);
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1586–87
(1987). Punitive damages are also controversial. See generally Symposium, The Future of Punitive
Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1998) (examining the side in the debate over insurance for punitive
damages).
14. This phrase is from Oliver Wendell Holmes: “[t]he general principle of our law is that loss
from accident must lie where it falls.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76 (Harvard U.
Press 1963) (1881). Holmes is referring to “accidents” but he seems to apply the principle more
broadly, since he says immediately after that the “cumbrous and expensive machinery [of the state]
ought not to be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo.”
Id. at 77.
15. There is not much literature about loss or risk spreading as a policy in the intentional tort
area. There appears to be no inherent reason why loss spreading is not an objective of intentional tort
liability. Gail Hollister claims that loss-spreading is not an objective of intentional tort liability: “[o]ne
goal of negligence liability—loss spreading—is not an objective of intentional tort liability because
generally it cannot be achieved by imposing liability on intentional tortfeasors.” Gail D. Hollister,
Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Tort Suits in
Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV. 121, 130 (1993). This is so, she
claims, because generally there is no insurance for intentional torts. See id. at 131. Sometimes,
however, insurance does cover intentional torts. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 120 n.66 (noting that
some kinds of insurance cover punitive damages); Jeffrey P. Klenk, Emerging Coverage Issues in
Employment Practices Liability Insurance: The Industry Perspective on Recent Developments, 21 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 333 (1999) (reviewing insurance coverage for sexual harassment and
intentional torts of employees). See also discussion infra Parts II.C.1, III.A.5. In such instances, lossspreading objectives presumably are being met. Loss-spreading as a goal is not inherently incompatible
with intentional tort liability.
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or even invisible to the public and the behavior of the perpetrator is not
condemned through the tort system.16
This Article offers a more effective approach17 to civil liability for
domestic violence torts through insurance reform. Part III.A discusses the
proposed “Domestic Violence Torts Insurance Plan.” The plan challenges
the conventional wisdom that intentional torts cannot or should not be
insurable, asserting instead that domestic violence torts can and should be
insured. Under the plan, liability insurance would be available to cover
claims for domestic violence torts in order to increase deterrence and
compensation and as a matter of fairness to domestic violence tort
victims.18 To work best, this liability insurance probably would need to be
a mandatory part of automobile liability insurance.19 If there is liability
coverage, more lawsuits will be filed, settled, and tried, since it is generally
easier to recover from a defendant’s liability insurance policy than from a
defendant’s assets.20 Persons harmed by domestic violence torts would be
more likely to receive compensation than they are now. Liability policies
would require that insureds reimburse insurers for payments they make for
domestic violence torts.21 Insurers would pursue such reimbursement, and
16. To the extent that the tort system presents moral guidelines for action, these guidelines are
not enforced where, as here, there is widespread harm yet lawsuits are not brought seeking
compensation for the harm. As David Owen writes, “[t]ort law . . . involves questions of how people
should treat one another and the rules of proper behavior that society imposes on each citizen for
avoiding improper harm to others, and for determining when compensation for harm is due.” David G.
Owen, Foreward: Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW 7 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). See infra Part II.D.3.
17. The term “approach,” rather than “system,” is used deliberately. The United States currently
does not have a compensation “system” for injury. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private
Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and
Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 75 (1993). This Article does not propose a comprehensive system, but
rather proposes a range of integrated changes in the arrangements of insurance and tort law.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 215–16 (1986) (noting that private automobile insurance is required and homeowners liability
coverage is nearly mandatory). As discussed more fully in Part III.A.4., I believe liability insurance
should be mandatory to prevent market failure and to promote the aims of public policy.
20. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Personal Injury, 35
LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming 2002). The factual settings of these torts make them different from
many other torts. Often, as with other torts, the facts will be murky. A battery claim or other claim
may be answered with a counterclaim. But factual complexity is nothing new for torts. Litigation is
designed to resolve factual conflicts, and there is nothing about domestic violence torts that make them
uniquely intractable.
21. This reimbursement requirement is a variation on the idea of subrogation. “Subrogation” is
“the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right,
so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its
rights, remedies, or securities.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed. 1990). In some instances,
when an insurer pays an insured for a loss, and the insured is entitled to recover for that loss from
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thus the assets of domestic violence tortfeasors would be at risk. The
deterrence of domestic violence torts should be greater than it is currently
because threats of liability and threats to assets will be real.22 Another
feature of this proposed plan is an insurance policy to cover tort claims
where a domestic violence tort defendant is uninsured. If a defendant is
uninsured, a person injured by domestic violence could make a claim under
the “uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor” part of her policy, which
would be similar in some ways to an uninsured motorist policy.23 The
“uninsured assailant provision” would also contain a reimbursement
requirement, so that the insurance company could pursue the assets of the
domestic violence tortfeasor. Thus, the deterrent effects of liability would
be present.24 Such a policy would probably need to be a mandatory part of
automobile insurance.25
In addition to the insurance features outlined above, a more effective
civil liability arrangement would be different from what we have now in
several other ways. Statutes of limitations would be long enough for a
woman to disentangle herself from an abusive relationship and still have
time to file suit for injuries.26 Procedural obstacles such as requiring tort
claims be brought with a divorce would be absent.27 These features also
would increase the likelihood that tort claims would be brought, and thus
increase deterrence and compensation. This proposed approach has
practical limitations, but should better deter tortfeasors and compensate
victims than the current system.
someone else, the insurer may be subrogated to the rights of the insured. This means that the insurer
“stands in the shoes” of the insured, and the insurer’s rights are equal to the insured’s rights. In other
words, the insured can go after the third party for whatever it paid on the insured’s behalf. See ROBERT
E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL
DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 3.10(a)(1) (Student ed. 1988). Usually an insurer’s rights
to subrogation are limited to those rights the insured may have had against third parties, and the insurer
cannot obtain subrogation against an insured. See id. at 221. Where insurance is covering claims for
intentional torts, however, the insurance company should be able to seek subrogation against its insured
to the amount it pays on his behalf for intentional tort claims. See Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388
A.2d 603 (N.J. 1978) (holding that an insurance company that compensates victim of arsonist’s action
may seek reimbursement from the arsonist).
22. See infra Parts II.D.1, III.A.2. The subject of criminal deterrence is beyond the scope of this
Article.
23. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
24. See infra Parts II.D.1, III.A.2.
25. The reasons the uninsured assailant provision would probably need to be mandatory are
similar to the reasons why the liability policy would need to be mandatory. See Part III.A.4.
26. See infra Part II.C.3. (discussing barriers posed by short statutes of limitations) and III.B.1.
(discussing proposed changes).
27. See infra Part III.B.2.
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More broadly, it is time to address, rather than take for granted, the
relative lack of deterrence and compensation that the tort and insurance
systems provide for domestic violence torts.
Particularly because
intentional harm is more serious than other types of harm for which the tort
system provides compensation,28 greater attention should be paid to the
barriers that prevent compensation for these intentional harms. Moreover,
ever since the United States Supreme Court struck down the VAWA civil
remedy provision in its 2000 term,29 the only civil remedy a victim may
pursue is likely to be through the tort system. While the complex dynamics
often involved in domestic violence30 may make development of these
ideas particularly challenging, it is important to remember that serious
consideration of these issues has only just begun.
Following the discussion of ideas to counter underenforcement, Part
IV discusses the focus of twentieth-century torts scholarship on accidental
harm, and highlights how this focus leaves domestic violence torts at the
periphery. Torts scholarship should place domestic violence torts at the
center of inquiry in view of the extensive harm that they cause.31
Moreover, existing approaches to domestic violence should be
supplemented by treating harm from domestic violence as tortious harm, in
addition to whatever else it might be.32 The fact that much domestic
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES states that “intentional torts are
deemed considerably more serious than torts of mere negligence.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 1 at 2–3 (Discussion Draft, April 5, 1999) [hereinafter, RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)]. See also JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, 333–34 (1992) (distinguishing actions
that are morally culpable from actions that are wrongful because they depart from objective norms of
conduct); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 391–92 (1975).
We do not need utilitarian analysis to decide that it is generally a bad thing for one person
deliberately to maim or kill another. . . . What offends the moral sense is that one person
deliberately uses his own power to deprive another of the very rights which he claims and
defends for himself.
Id.; Pryor, supra note 10, at 1727 (noting that “[a]cting with a purpose to inflict personal injury is
morally more objectionable than acting in a way that deviates from an objectified standard of
reasonable care with respect to the creation of risk”).
29. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). There is now an effort to pass state
versions of the Violence Against Women Act. To date, none have passed. See, e.g., ARIZ. SB 1535
(introduced Arizona 44th Legislature 2000). The analysis used by the Supreme Court is beyond the
scope of this Article, although one of the assumptions of this Article is that contrary to the majority
opinion, violence against women including domestic violence is not “purely local” in nature. See
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18. See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the
Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing historical and current ideological link
between women and private sphere, and arguing that opposition to VAWA civil rights remedy endorses
link between women and private sphere); Goldscheid, supra note 6; MacKinnon, supra note 6.
30. See infra notes 89–92, 100–20 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See generally Sally Goldfarb, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, FDCH
Congressional Testimony, November 16, 1993, at 3 (noting that violence against women, including
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violence is also prohibited by criminal statutes does not mean that such
violence is not tortious as well. It is legitimate, and indeed necessary, to
bring the tools of insurance and torts to bear on this widespread harm.33
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS, AND THE SHORT-LIVED CIVIL
RIGHTS REMEDY OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
A. APPLICABLE THEORIES AND RELEVANT HISTORY
Common law intentional torts include domestic violence34 and rape.35
Harm from domestic violence between members of a married couple only
recently became actionable as tortious since such suits used to be barred by
interspousal tort immunity.36 Rape (by someone other than one’s husband)
has been civilly actionable in some jurisdictions since the early 1900s.37
Harm from domestic violence often meets the elements of battery.
According to Dan Dobbs, “[t]he defendant is subject to liability for a
simple battery when he intentionally causes bodily contact to the plaintiff
in a way not justified by the plaintiff’s apparent wishes or by a privilege,
domestic violence, is a form of discrimination against women); Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the
Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1994)
(arguing that domestic violence, stripped of ideologies that support it, is torture under international
human rights principles).
33. See infra Part III.A–B.
34. For scholarship discussing the intersection of domestic violence and tort law, see LEONARD
KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE
(1989); Dalton, supra note 4; Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a
Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268 (1996); Leonard Karp & Cheryl L. Karp, Beyond the Normal Ebb and
Flow . . . Infliction of Emotional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389 (1989);
Scherer, supra note 9; Robert G. Spector, Marital Torts: The Current Legal Landscape, 33 FAM. L. Q.
745 (1999); Weiner, supra note 7; Rhonda L. Kohler, Comment: The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A
New Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025 (1992); David E. Poplar,
Comment: Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Battered Women after Giovine v. Giovine: Creating
Equitable Exceptions for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 161 (1996).
35. See Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1419 (1999). See also Corinne Casarino, Note, Civil Remedies in Acquaintance
Rape Cases, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185 (1996); Holly J. Manley, Comment, Civil Compensation of the
Victim of Rape, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 193 (1990).
36. See Spector, supra note 34, at 745; Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23
GA. L. REV. 359 (1989). See generally Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love:” Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (tracing historical development of rationales for
interspousal immunity).
37. Bublick, supra note 35, at 1419–20. See generally Hasday, supra note 7. Rape within
marriage used to be legal. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 86 S.W. 754, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905) (noting
that a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife). The marital exception for rape has been modified or
eliminated in every state. See GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 849 (Katherine
Bartlett & Angela Harris eds., 2d ed. 1998).
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and the contact is in fact harmful or against the plaintiff’s will.”38 The
plaintiff in a battery suit need not even show that the defendant intended to
cause harm.39 The defendant’s damages liability for battery is broad.40
Indeed, punitive damages may be available.41 Battery claims sometimes
have been used by ex-wives to try to recover for injuries during marriage,42
although significant procedural and other obstacles can make such claims
difficult.43
Another possible avenue for recovery is a tort claim for assault which
is “an act that is intended to and does place the plaintiff in apprehension of
an immediate unconsented-to touching that would amount to a battery.”44
Damages are recoverable even when no physical injury is inflicted.45 Some
38. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 28, at 52–53 (2000). Prosser and Keeton define battery as: “harmful or offensive contact with
a person, resulting from an act intended to cause the plaintiff or a third person to suffer such a contact.”
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 9, at 39 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
39. “It is enough that the defendant intends bodily contact that is “offensive,” which is to say a
bodily contact that does not appear acceptable to the plaintiff and that is not permitted by a rule of law.”
DOBBS, supra note 38, § 28. The tort of battery is similar to the crime of assault. Under Maine law, for
example, “[a] person is guilty of assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury or offensive physical contact to another.” 17-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207 (2000).
While tort battery claims seek recovery for conduct that is probably criminal, this is not necessarily true
of assault claims or intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 189
n.6 (explaining that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims target conduct that is not
necessarily criminal).
40. “Once a battery is established, the defendant becomes liable for the harms resulting,
including unintended ones. He may intend only an offensive touching, but he is liable for any actual
harm that results . . . he is also liable for impermissible touchings that are not physically harmful.”
DOBBS, supra note 38, § 28. While liability was originally thought of “in terms of force and violence,”
it now “vindicates the plaintiff’s rights of autonomy and self-determination, her right to decide for
herself how her body will be treated by others, and to exclude their invasions as a matter of personal
preference, whether physical harm is done or not.” Id. Dobbs notes that “the plaintiff’s right to avoid
unwanted intentional contact does not depend upon the defendant’s hostile intent or even upon the
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s wishes.” Id. § 29, at 54.
41. Circumstances in which punitive damages may be available include where the defendant acts
with a particularly reprehensible state of mind, such as with “malice or oppression.” DOBBS, supra note
38, § 42. Some states limit the amount of punitive damages that can be recovered. See id.
42. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 530 So. 2d 1389 (Ala. 1988) (ruling wife estopped from bringing
assault and battery claims after divorce based on negotiations concerning injuries in settlement of
divorce action); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding prior divorce judgment
does not bar wife’s action for damages from shooting by husband); Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d
151 (Mass. 1988) (ruling claim for “assaultive” actions not precluded by earlier divorce action); Cain v.
McKinnon, 552 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1989) (holding interspousal immunity does not bar tort action for
“savage beating”).
43. See infra Part II.C.4. See also Dalton, supra note 4, at 374–94 (describing several obstacles
to such recovery under common law and the laws of several states).
44. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 33. “The plaintiff’s subjective recognition or apprehension that she
is about to be touched in an impermissible way is at the core of the assault claim.” Id.
45. Id. at 64.
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successful claims have been brought for assaults during marriages, but
procedural obstacles are similar to those that challenge battery claims.46
A third possible tort claim is intentional infliction of emotional
distress.47 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that “[o]ne who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress.”48 This tort has been used in many states to seek compensation for
harms from domestic violence.49 Other tort theories such as false
imprisonment are also possible.50 Some commentators have suggested that
a new tort be created that specifically addresses domestic violence.51
From 1995 to 2000, the civil rights remedy of VAWA provided an
additional potential remedy for some domestic violence injuries: under
VAWA individuals “have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender.”52 To prove that a plaintiff was a victim of a crime
46. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 374–94.
47. For a thorough discussion of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the
context of domestic violence, see Weiner, supra note 7.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) [HEREINAFTER RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
The Third Restatement of Torts, currently under development, does not address emotional distress. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28.
49. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 184–86, nn.10–11. See, e.g., Henricksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d
1135 (Me. 1993). Intent can be shown by either “evidence that the defendant acted with a desire or
purpose to accomplish the harm, or by evidence that such harm was substantially certain to
occur. . . . [A] reckless or willful attitude will also suffice to meet the requirement.” DOBBS, supra note
38, § 303. See generally KARP & KARP, supra note 34. Issues have arisen in the domestic violence
context as to whether conduct was sufficiently “outrageous” to be actionable; courts have applied the
standard in inconsistent ways. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 200–23. The Restatement’s formulation for
outrageousness is: “Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member
of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
‘Outrageous!’.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra, note 48, § 46, cmt. d. Not surprisingly, the circularity
of this definition has contributed to the inconsistency with which it has been applied. See Weiner,
supra note 7, at 200–23. One of the barriers to recovery in some cases appears to have been the notion
that domestic violence is not “outrageous.” See id. at 219–21; Dalton, supra note 4, at 341–43.
50. See Daniel G. Atkins, Jan R. Jurden, Susan L. Miller & Elizabeth A. Patten, Striving for
Justice with the Violence Against Women Act and Civil Tort Actions, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 69, 84
n.74 (1999) (suggesting additional possible tort causes of action for domestic abuse cases: “stalking,
rape, trespassing, negligent transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, defamation, outrage, wrongful imprisonment, property or economic torts, and
wrongful death). See generally KARP & KARP, supra note 34. False imprisonment is “established by
proof that the defendant intentionally confined or instigated the confinement of the plaintiff.
Confinement “implies that the plaintiff is constrained against her will.” DOBBS, supra note 38, § 36. In
addition, the plaintiff “must have been aware of the confinement at the time.” Id.
51. See, e.g., Kohler, supra note 34, at 1067–68. Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. App.
Div. 1995) (recognizing continuing tort of battered women syndrome). See generally Anita Bernstein,
How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539 (1997) (discussing development of
new torts generally).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1999).
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motivated by gender, she had to show that the crime was “due, at least in
part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.”53 The crime had to be a
felony,54 although the defendant did not have to be convicted to be civilly
liable.55 Victims of gender-motivated crimes could sue their attackers in
state or federal court for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive relief.56 While the civil rights remedy provision was in effect,
the majority of plaintiffs seeking recovery under VAWA joined their
claims with intentional tort claims inlcuding those in the domestic violence
context.57 This combination of VAWA claims and intentional tort claims is
not surprising, since the prerequisites for such tort liability are generally
less stringent than the requirements for VAWA civil liability.58 It also
53. Id. § 13981(d)(1).
54. Id. § 13981(d)(2)(a).
55. Id. § 13981(e)(2).
56. Id. § 13981(c).
57. Seventy-three reported decisions in state and federal court discussed the civil remedy
provision of VAWA. A search of 42 U.S.C. § 13981 in the ALLCASES database of Westlaw retrieves
164 cases. However, the majority of these cases do not pertain to the civil remedy provision, and
pertain instead to attorney fees or criminal matters. A manual search through these cases produced the
following numbers. Intentional tort claims were brought in at least fifty-one of the seventy-three
lawsuits. It is not possible to tell in each of the seventy-three reported decisions whether the plaintiff
brought tort claims in addition to VAWA claims, since many of the decisions are on motions to dismiss
only some counts of a plaintiff’s complaint; thus the decisions do not discuss all counts of a plaintiff’s
complaint. With respect to the remaining twenty-two reported decisions, twelve of the lawsuits
probably included tort claims and ten probably did not include tort claims. Memo dated February 6,
2001 (on file with the author). Of the seventy-three reported decisions, eleven arose in domestic abuse
situations. Of these, eight had tort claims, two probably had tort claims, and one did not. See, e.g.,
Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. La. 1999) (bringing claims against ex-husband for
battery, assault and other torts with VAWA claims); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 1998 WL 673629 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(bringing state tort claims with VAWA claim for personal injuries from husband’s assaults and
batteries); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997), dismissed 2000 U.S. App. Lexis
12146 (6th Cir. 2000) (bringing state tort claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, false imprisonment and other torts with VAWA claims against ex-husband); Avila-Franco v.
Worrell, 1998 U.S. Dist Lexis 12129 (1998) (bringing claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress with sexual harassment in employment case). Unreported cases may also have
combined VAWA claims with intentional tort claims. See, e.g., Atkins et al., supra note 50 (describing
domestic abuse lawsuit that ultimately settled, which combined VAWA and tort claims). See generally
Steven M. Pincus & David N. Rosen, Fighting Back: Filing Suit Under the Violence Against Women
Act, TRIAL, Dec. 1997, at 20 (noting high percentage of violent attacks committed on women by
intimate partners and recommending bringing VAWA lawsuits for domestic violence in appropriate
cases).
58. VAWA civil liability often was harder to establish than intentional tort liability because of
the requirements that a victim show that the defendant had committed a felony-level crime. See 42
U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A). See, e.g., Wright v. Blythe-Nelson, 2000 WL 349747 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(dismissing VAWA claim because no allegation of felony-level crime by defendant had been made but
not dismissing battery claim); Palazzolo v. Ruggiano, 993 F. Supp. 45 (D. R.I. 1998) (dismissing
VAWA claim against psychiatrist because no allegation of felony-level crime). VAWA also required
that the victim show that the crime was “a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the
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speaks to the viability of tort theories in the wider class of domestic
violence cases.
B. THE RELATIVE DEARTH OF LAWSUITS FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS
Civil actions for intentional torts such as battery, assault, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress are rare, particularly in relation
to the high rate of domestic violence in our society.59 Intentional tort
lawsuits comprise a small minority of tort lawsuits:60
[Of] 2600 reported state cases of battery, assault, or both, from 1981
through 1990, only fifty-three involved adult parties in domestic
relationships. Similarly, during the same time frame, only four reported
federal cases involved a claim or counterclaim between adult parties in a
domestic relationship. From 1958 through 1990 slightly more than 6000
intentional infliction of emotional distress cases were reported from all
state and federal courts. Evaluation of these cases revealed a total of
basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981(d)(1). In several instances, defendants failed in getting cases dismissed on the basis that the
plaintiff did not sufficiently allege gender animus. See, e.g., Jugmohan v. Zola, 2000 WL
222186(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding allegations that defendant used sexual language to a stranger,
commented on her figure and breasts, physically attacked her, and had a history of doing similar things
in the workplace were sufficient to state claim); Mattison v. Click Corp. of America, 1998 WL
32597(E.D. Pa. 1998) (ruling that allegations of sexual assault, harassment and battering by defendant,
if proven would satisfy gender animus requirement). It is difficult to tell how these matters would fare
in front of a jury; Morrison of course made these cases moot. Neither the requirement of showing a
felony crime nor of showing that the crime was committed based on gender and due in part to genderbased animus is necessary for proving tort liability. See supra text accompanying notes 35–59. In
addition, criminal assault (which frequently includes the common law tort of battery) is often a
misdemeanor rather than a felony. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207 (2000) (Punishment
of Class D crimes); 17-A ME. REV. STAT. § 1252(D) (assault is class D crime, punishable by a period
of less than one year). Intentional infliction of emotional distress often provides liability for conduct
that is not criminal. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 189 n.16. Thus, intentional tort liability is
significantly broader than civil VAWA liability would have been.
59. See sources cited supra note 2.
60. According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics report, 2.9% of the tort cases, or 10,879 cases,
disposed of in the nation’s seventy-five largest counties in 1992, were intentional tort cases. Steven K.
Smith, Carol J. DeFrance & Patrick A. Langan, Tort Cases in Large Counties, Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts 1992, BUREAU OF JUSTICIE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, April 1995, NCJ-153177, at 2.
The report did not specify the content of the intentional tort cases, so it is not possible to determine
exactly how many were for domestic violence injuries. The report did break down the cases by whether
the plaintiff, the defendant, or both, were individuals. 94.9% of the intentional tort cases, or 10,324,
were brought by individuals. Id. at 4 & tbl.5. In 44.4% of these cases, or 4,830, the defendant was an
individual. Id. Thus, a very small proportion of the civil cases disposed of, 4,830, roughly 1.27%, had
even the possibility of seeking compensation for domestic violence injuries.
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eighteen in which courts have applied the tort action to a domestic abuse
fact pattern.61

There are accounts of the increased use of intentional torts in divorce
litigation, including as a means for recovering for domestic violence
injuries.62 There appear, however, to be neither statistics on published tort
cases seeking recovery for domestic violence injuries since Scherer’s 1992
article, nor studies of unpublished cases.
Government administrators predicted that the civil rights remedy
provision of VAWA would generate thousands of lawsuits in view of the
extent of violent victimization of women.63 These predictions proved
unfounded. In fact, only seventy-three reported cases dealt with VAWA’s
civil remedy provision.64
61. Scherer, supra note 9, at 565. Weiner, writing about intentional infliction of emotional
distress in 1995, lists twenty-eight reported cases where intentional infliction of emotional distress was
used in a domestic violence setting. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 184–86 nn.10–11. It is not clear why
the numbers they list differ; however, that does not detract from the broader point that reported lawsuits
for intentional infliction of emotional distress cases are uncommon.
62. See, e.g., William J. Glucksman & Kristina C. Royce, Remedies: Whether to Pursue
Potential Interspousal Tort Actions, 6 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 3, at 4 (Nov. 1999) (noting growing
trend towards asserting tort claims in matrimonial contexts); Diana Digges, Lawyers Join Domestic
Violence Torts to Divorce Judgments: Judge Leads Quiet Revolution to Educate Family Lawyers, LAW
WKLY. USA, Feb. 19 2001, at B-3; Fredrica L. Lehrman, Uncovering the Hidden Tort: Domestic
Violence May Provide Grounds for Civil Action Against Abusers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 82 (reporting
that tort law is becoming increasingly important in domestic violence context); William C. Smith, See
You in Divorce Tort: Splitting Spouses Raise RICO, Fraud and Other Claims, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at
30 (noting trend that divorcing spouses are adding more tort claims).
63. When an early version of VAWA, the Violence Against Women Act of 1991, was proposed,
the Judicial Impact Statement prepared by the Office of Judicial Impact Assessment of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, predicted that the civil rights remedy provision “may generate
as many as 53,800 civil tort cases annually.” JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT OF 1991, S. 15, OFFICE OF JUDICIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS (1991), at 15–16 [hereinafter JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT]. This estimate was
based on both rape and aggravated assault statistics. The Judicial Impact Statement stated:
there are approximately 2.6 million violent victimizations of women annually, which includes
155,000 attempted and completed rapes (102,000 attempted and 53,000 completed) . . . . Not
all of the women involved in the 2.6 million violent victimizations will file a civil tort action.
The analysis used the number of: 1. Reported rapes which were completed and the attacker
was known. This reduces the number of potential rape cases from 155,000 a year to 15,100
per year. 2. Reported other violent crimes against women that were aggravated assaults and
reported to the authorities, the attacker was known, and there was a desire by the victim to
‘punish’ the offender. This reduces the number of potential other cases from 2.45 million a
year to 38,700 . . . . The actual caseloads may be substantially lower or higher than this
estimate. It could be lower because many of the offenders will have limited assets, thus
discouraging tort cases.
Id. at 18.
64. Memorandum by Dennis Carrillo (Mar. 2, 2001) (on file with author). The majority of these
include intentional tort claims. While seventy-three reported cases may be a substantial number given
the short duration the statute was in effect, it is a minuscule number in comparison to the extent of
violent victimization of women. This was predicted by the proponents of the VAWA civil rights
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C. REASONS FOR THE DEARTH
Why are there so few lawsuits, given that injuries are widespread and
that interspousal immunity, which in the past would have barred many such
cases, no longer pertains? Many forces combine to create the dearth.65
1. Lack of Insurance
Insurance (or the lack of it) is extremely important in all aspects of tort
litigation. Torts and insurance cannot be understood in isolation from one
another.66 Litigation for harms from domestic violence is no exception.
There is very little third-party liability insurance coverage67 for defendants
accused of domestic violence torts. Lack of insurance is a major
contributor to the scarcity of tort claims for domestic violence injuries.68
The most common types of liability insurance policies issued to
individuals, such as homeowners, renters, and automobile policies,
remedy provision. See Testimony of Sally F. Goldfarb, FDCH Congressional Testimony, Nov. 16,
1993, at 8 (predicting that the civil remedy provision would “provide a significant new remedy without
generating a large number of cases”).
65. The discussion in the text pertains largely to intentional torts, but most of it applies as well to
the now-ineffectual VAWA civil rights remedy provision. Where there are issues specific to VAWA,
they are flagged in the footnotes. Of course, interspousal immunity would not have barred claims
between cohabiting unmarried couples.
66. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 130 (noting relationship between torts and insurance); Kent
D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1114–15 (1990) (discussing relationship between
torts and insurance and noting that some insurance coverage preceded assertion of tort claims covered
by such insurance). As Marshall Shapo states:
Tort litigation in modern life takes place almost entirely against a background of liability
insurance carried by persons who engage in risky activities to protect themselves against the
financial consequences of judgments entered against them under tort law. . . . [K]eep in mind
that when a lawyer for an injury claimant decides to take a case, and as litigation progresses,
the insurance coverage of the defendant is typically assumed by both sides to provide a pool
of money that will pay for all, or a significant part, of any judgment. Indeed, if the potential
defendant has no liability insurance, and no independent wealth, it is not likely that there will
be a suit at all.
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT AND INJURY LAW 166 (2d ed. 2000).
67. Liability insurance is often referred to as “third-party insurance,” since it protects insureds
against claims by third parties, as contrasted with “first-party insurance,” such as health insurance, fire
insurance, or uninsured motorist coverage, which covers the insured’s own direct losses. 7 Lee R. Russ
& Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d (West) § 101:58 (1997). “Liability insurance” is a
“[c]ontract by which one party promises on consideration to compensate or reimburse other if he shall
suffer loss from specified cause or to guaranty or indemnify or secure him against loss from that cause.
That type of insurance protection which indemnifies one from liability to third persons as contrasted
with insurance coverage for losses sustained by the insured.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (6th ed.
1990).
68. See Pincus & Rosen, supra note 57, at 20 (noting one reason so few torts suits are filed for
domestic violence is insurance exclusions). See infra Part II.B for discussion of the dearth of claims.
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typically exclude coverage for “intentional acts” of the insured.69 As a
result of this “intentional acts exclusion,” if a plaintiff brings a claim for
intentional torts and the insured is a homeowner or renter with liability
insurance,70 the insurance company is likely to claim (successfully) that the
suit is not covered by the policy.71
69. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, §§ 5.3(f), 5.4(d). See generally Baker, supra note 10,
at 120; James A. Fischer, The Exclusion from Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional
Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of a Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 110–27 (1990);
George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1015–16 (1989); Pryor,
supra note 10. Specialized forms of insurance do cover punitive damages; these policies are likely to
provide coverage for intentional acts. See Baker, supra note 10, at 120 n.66. Moreover, many
employers’ liability policies cover employers for intentional acts of employees. See Klenk, supra note
15, at 333; infra Part III.A.5.a. The scope of the “intentional acts” exclusion varies from state to state.
See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21. In some states, for the exclusion to apply, the insured must have
intended not only the act in question, but the consequences of the act as well. See id. at 520–21. This
interpretation results in a fairly narrow exclusion, since tort defendants can claim that they intended the
act, but not the full consequences of it, and thereby retain coverage. See id. Other states subscribe to a
broader exclusion whereby all that is necessary for the exclusion to apply is for the insured to have
intended the act. See id. In either case, the intentional act exclusion creates incentives for plaintiffs to
characterize harm as caused by negligence rather than by intentional acts to secure insurance coverage
for their claims. See Pryor, supra note 10, at 1722–27. Ellen Pryor terms this phenomenon, which is
not limited to domestic violence cases, “underlitigating.” See id.; Dalton, supra note 4, at 341
(describing dilemma for women injured by domestic violence to characterize harm as negligently
inflicted in order to secure insurance coverage and thus compensation).
70. Lenders, as a condition of obtaining mortgages, require homeowners to maintain liability
insurance. See Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Whose Safety Net? Home Insurance and Inequality, 21
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 242–43 (1996) (noting that financing a home requires purchase of insurance
but that there is no mechanism compelling purchase of insurance for renters); Leah Wortham, The
Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
835, 871 (1986) (obtaining insurance is a requirement for procuring financing on a car or home). Once
a mortgage is paid off, lenders cannot require homeowners to maintain liability insurance. Roughly
forty percent of owner-occupied homes in the United States are owned free and clear, and thus do not
require liability insurance. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED
STATES Table 3-15 (1997), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs97
/tab315.html.
71. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 5.3(f). If the potential tort defendant is uninsured,
there is no other source of recovery for that defendant’s liability to which a potential plaintiff can turn.
This differs from the automobile situation where a person can seek recovery from her uninsured
motorist coverage if the defendant who has injured her is not insured. Part III includes a proposal for
first-party insurance that could be used if a domestic violence tortfeasor is uninsured. Similarly,
insurance companies in all likelihood denied coverage for civil VAWA claims against individual
perpetrators, since for an act to meet the requirements of VAWA civil liability, the act would almost
certainly fall within the “intentional acts” exclusion of the tortfeasor’s liability policy. Moreover,
efforts to insure against consequences of criminal activity generally have been rejected by courts,
largely on the grounds that they violate public policy. See 1 Russ & Segalla, supra note 67, § 1.34
(2001). This “public policy” argument would seem to be a particular barrier for VAWA claims because
of the statutory requirements that a plaintiff prove that the defendant had committed a felony-level
crime. Some activity that is tortious, such as much conduct causing intentional infliction of emotional
distresses, is not criminal. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 189 n.16. See infra Part III.A.5.b.
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A second common barrier to liability insurance coverage is the
“family member exclusion.”
Often with jointly owned property,
homeowners liability policies name all owners or residents as insureds, and
exclude all claims by insureds against one another.72 Thus, a tort claim of
any sort between insureds would not be covered by such a policy. If a
husband inadvertently left a shoe on the stairs and his wife slipped on it and
was injured, the policy would not cover him for her negligence claim
against him. If the husband did the same act but a guest slipped and was
injured, however, the policy would cover the guest’s negligence claim.
Family member exclusions were once standard in automobile policies but
have been struck down in many jurisdictions in recent years.73
These insurance barriers limit or in many instances, vitiate, insurance
coverage. Even if litigation would likely be successful on the merits, these
insurance issues present hurdles that discourage filing lawsuits even in
cases of clear liability and serious injury.74
2. Asset Limitations
Resource limitations are another reason why there are so few reported
lawsuits seeking recovery for harms from domestic violence torts.
72. See, e.g., Principal Cas. Ins. Co. v. Blair, 500 N.W.2d 67, 68–69 (Iowa 1993) (upholding
family member exclusion in homeowners policy and noting that such exclusions are contained in every
homeowners policy in Iowa); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. White, 993 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that a family member exclusion in homeowners policy is binding). For example, State
Farm’s standard homeowners policy defines the “insured” as “you, and if residents of your household,
(a) your relatives and (b) any other person under 21 who is in the care of any person described above.”
State Farm Standard Homeowners Policy, Definitions, on file with the author. The policy also excludes
coverage for “bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of part (a) or (b) of the definition
of the insured.” Id. at II, 2.f, p. 14. Thus, the policyholder, and relatives who live with the policyholder,
cannot make claims against the policy. See id. These types of provisions are also found in automobile
policies.
73. In many states with mandatory automobile insurance laws, the exclusions have been struck
down as contrary to the public policies supporting mandatory coverage and compensation of those
injured in automobile accidents. See, e.g., Cartner v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 472 S.E.2d 389,
391 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Nat. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1993) (striking
down auto family exclusion as contrary to public policy and inconsistent with purposes of mandatory
insurance law, up to mandatory insurance limit); Tissell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 795 P.2d 126, 128
(Wash. 1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 516 A.2d 586 (Md. 1986);
Bishop v. Allstate Ins., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981); DeWitt v. Young, 625 P.2d 478 (Kan. 1981);
Arceneaux v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 550 P.2d 87, 89 (Ariz. 1976); GEICO v. Morris, 1997 WL
527982 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997). But see Setters v. Permanent Gen. Assurance Co., 937 S.W.2d 950, 953
(Tenn. App. 1996); Thompson v. Miss. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 602 So.2d 855, 858 (Miss. 1992);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Henry, 563 N.E.2d 1265, 1269 (Ind. 1990); Cook v. Wausau Underwriters Ins.
Co., 772 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ark. 1989); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Boles, 481 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 1985)
(upholding household exclusion from automobile policy as consistent with public policy).
74. Part III.A. describes ideas for insurance reform.
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Financial recovery against a defendant who lacks assets or insurance is not
possible.75 Many persons in the United States are judgment-proof.76
A house is often a person’s or family’s largest asset. In the United
States in 1999, 66.8% of the adult population owned a home,77 but there are
considerable regional variations in home ownership78 as well as racial
disparities.79 In a domestic violence situation, this asset may be jointly
owned by the victim and the perpetrator, complicating the obtaining of the
asset. The house may be mortgaged,80 protected by a homestead
exemption,81 located in another state, or encumbered by preexisting
involuntary liens. Moreover, lawyers are likely to be more reluctant to
pursue a claim on a contingency basis when the only asset is a house
owned by the defendant than if there is insurance.82 Even when there are
significant assets, attorneys prefer to seek funds provided by insurance.83
75. See Leonard Karp & Laura C. Belleau, Litigating Domestic Emotional Distress Claims, 18
FAIR$HARE 2 (1998) (“Almost every divorce case carries with it some form of domestic tort. . . . Only
when there is a serious physical or psychological injury and a source of recovery, should a practitioner
consider pursuing a separate tort action.”).
76. It is difficult to get exact estimates, but a 1991 Judicial Impact Statement for an earlier
version of the Violence Against Women Act noted that “75 to 80 percent of current criminal cases
require appointment of public defenders,” which suggests that those defendants are judgment-proof.
JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 63, at 16. Moreover, many Americans are heavily in debt
even if they would not qualify for the services of a public defender. See Kathy Bergen, Americans
Handling Debt for Now, But Danger Lurks, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2000. See generally ARTHUR B.
KENNICKELL, MARTHA STARR-MCCLUER & BRIAN J. SURRETTE, RECENT CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY
FINANCES: RESULTS FROM THE 1998 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (2000).
77. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: HOUSING VACANCIES & HOMEOWNERSHIP ANNUAL STATISTICS:
1999, tbl.13, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual99/ann99t13.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2001). Of course, domestic violence perpetrators come from all walks of life. See
Sally Goldfarb, FDCH Congressional Testimony in support of VAWA, Nov. 16, 1993, at 5 (noting that
violence against women is found at all socioeconomic levels and that even an uncollectible judgment
will be seen by some victims as a vindication of their rights).
78. For example, in 1999 Maine had the highest homeownership rate in the country, 77.4%,
while the District of Columbia had the lowest, 40%. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 77.
79. For example, the 1999 white homeownership rate was 70.5% whereas the black
homeownership rate was 46.3%. Id. at tbl.20.
80. As of 1997, about 61% of owner-occupied homes were mortgaged. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 70.
81. Several states, including Florida, Texas, Iowa, South Dakota and Kansas, have unlimited
homestead exemptions. See Floyd Norris, The New Bankruptcy Reform: Make The Rich Plan Ahead,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2000, at C1.
82. See, e.g., Karp & Belleau, supra note 75, at 2; Pincus & Rosen, supra note 57, at 20 (noting
that reasons why so few suits are filed for domestic violence includes lack of defendant assets); Michael
J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1190 (1992) (“lawyers usually do not accept a case unless they see an
acceptable probability of economic success for themselves in doing so”).
83. See Baker, supra note 20, at 6–25. Another potential asset is a pension or 401K plan, but
these assets are difficult to obtain. 29 U.S.C. §1056 (2000) (requiring pension plans must specify that
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Getting a private attorney to take a case on a contingency basis where
there are neither assets nor insurance is difficult, if not impossible.84 If a
plaintiff has funds to pay an attorney, she is more likely to find one, but
most potential plaintiffs are not in a position to pay a private attorney to
pursue a claim.
3. Statutes of Limitations
Another reason so few tort lawsuits are filed for harm from domestic
violence torts is the relatively short statutes of limitations for most
intentional torts.85 Statutes of limitations for assault, battery, and false
imprisonment are typically between one and two years.86 Although statutes
of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress range from one
to ten years, the most common statutes of limitations lengths are two and
three years.87 By contrast, statutes of limitations for negligence and strict
liability generally are longer, ranging from two to six years.88
benefits under the plan may not be alienated); Richard I. Loebl & Orin D. Brustad, Effect of
Participant’s Insolvency Unclear, NATL’L L.J., Jan. 20, 1992, at 21 (noting that while pension benefits
cannot be garnished in state court, confusion remains about whether creditors can reach such benefits
when an individual files for bankruptcy).
84. See Saks, supra note 82, at 1190.
85. The historical origins of this disparity are reviewed in Part III.B.1.a. The statute of
limitations for the VAWA civil rights remedy provision presented a different situation, since VAWA
did not include a statute of limitations. Commentators asserted that the four year “catch all” federal
statute of limitations applied to VAWA claims. See, e.g. Goldscheid, supra note 6, at 114 n.31 and
sources cited therein. Courts were divided as to whether VAWA claims would be governed by the
four-year statute of limitations established by 28 U.S.C. § 1658 or by an analogous state statute of
limitations. See, e.g., Grace v. Thomason Nissan, 76 F. Supp. 2d. 1083 (D. Or. 1999) (applying fouryear statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 1658 to VAWA claim); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Kan. 1999) (ruling that VAWA claims are governed by Kansas two-year statute of
limitations); Santiago v. Alonso, 66 F. Supp. 2d. 269 (D. P.R. 1999) (applying Puerto Rico’s one-year
statute of limitations to VAWA claim).
86. In thirty-eight states, the statute of limitations for assault and battery claims is one or two
years. See Carrillo, supra note 64. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 9.10.070 (providing two years for
assault, battery, and false imprisonment); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-104 (providing one year for assault,
battery, and false imprisonment); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514(4) (Supp.) (providing one year for assault,
battery, and false imprisonment); MD. CTS. & JUD. CODE ANN. § 5-105 (providing one year for assault
and battery); S.C. CODE § 15-3-550 (providing two years for assault, battery, and false imprisonment).
See also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 245–47 (1989) (listing many states’ statutes of limitations for
intentional torts).
87. Eighteen states have a statute of limitations of two years for intentional infliction of
emotional distress; nine states have a statute of limitations of three years. See Carrillo, supra note 64.
Statutes of limitations often do not specifically list intentional infliction of emotional distress, but it is
included in the general or “residual” statute of limitations. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-56-104(2)
(2000) (providing one year for assault and battery, five years for residual claims); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-18-102(a) (1987) (providing two years for torts involving outrageous conduct); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-513(a)(4) (Supp.) (providing one year for assault and battery, two years for injuries to rights of
another, not arising from contract and not otherwise specified); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
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The complex dynamics of domestic violence, which often include
extensive psychological control, as well as physical violence,89 can make
consideration of filing a tort claim near the time that the injuries are
inflicted inconceivable. Abuse and control may last for years, and a victim
may only be able to escape from the relationship, at great risk, after a long
period of time.90 By the time a person is able to leave an abusive
relationship (whether married or unmarried) and decides to sue, the statute
of limitations on some or all of her intentional tort claims may well have
run.91
4. Procedural Barriers
Existing law makes the conjunction of divorce and tort claims
complicated and fraught with potential difficulty for domestic violence tort
victims.92 Various procedural obstacles can make it difficult or impossible
§ 5-101 (providing three years for all civil actions, not including assault and battery); S.C. CODE
§ 15-3-530(5) (providing six years for any injury to “the person or rights of another” not arising from a
contract, and not specified elsewhere).
88. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 357.
89. See DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 50–115 (excerpting articles on the dynamics of
domestic violence); Dalton, supra note 4, at 330–38 (describing psychological as well as physical
dynamics of domestic violence).
90. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 337–38 (describing dynamics of abuse, including increased
danger to women who leave abusive relationships). See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991) (describing risks to
women who leave abusive relationships).
91. Seaton v. Seaton, a Tennessee case in which the plaintiff combined tort and VAWA claims
against her batterer, illustrates the phenomenon. Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn.
1997), dismissed 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 12146 (6th Cir. 2000). According to the plaintiff, she was
abused from 1992–95. The abuse perpetrated by her husband during the marriage included assault,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 1189. In 1995, the parties had an
altercation, the day after which she filed for divorce. She filed tort and VAWA claims in federal court
364 days after the altercation. Tennessee’s statute of limitations for intentional and other torts was one
year, so that all of the intentional tort claims that arose from events prior to the final altercation were
time-barred in federal court. See id. at 1195. By contrast, if Ms. Seaton had been suing for injury to
property, she would have had three years to file in court. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-105 (1999).
The court also held that the continuing tort doctrine did not allow the late assertion of her claims. See
Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1195. The plaintiff also had made tort claims in her state court divorce action;
this may have influenced the federal court decision. See id. at 1195–96. The timeliness of Ms. Seaton’s
VAWA claim was not challenged. Another example is Henriksen v. Cameron, in which an ex-wife
sued her ex-husband for intentional infliction of emotional distress that he had allegedly inflicted during
the marriage. Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993). He also had physically abused her,
but the assault and battery claims were time-barred by Maine’s two-year statute of limitations. See id.
at 1142. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim nonetheless was allowed because it was
filed within the six-year statute of limitations for that tort. See id.
92. This Subsection pertains to procedural barriers of marriage and divorce. Other significant
barriers, distinct from procedural barriers, face persons attempting to end relationships with abusers.
See discussion supra Part II.C.3., infra Part II.C.5.

2001]

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS

141

for an abused person to bring a tort claim for abuse that occurs during a
marriage. To bring a claim for compensation while a marriage continues
has obvious problems. A person is unlikely to be able to even consider
such a claim until she has decided to seek a divorce.93 A married person’s
most immediate legal need at that time may be to end the legal relationship
with her spouse. Her most immediate practical needs may be physical and
economic survival, and maintaining contact with her children.94 Asserting
tort claims at the time of divorce may jeopardize all those interests.95
Despite these and other reasons why tort claims should not have to be
asserted at the time of divorce, some courts have held that a tort claim for
abuse occurring during a marriage must be asserted at the time of the
divorce, or it is barred by res judicata.96 Other courts have held that
principles of waiver and equitable estoppel may bar tort actions filed after
divorces.97
5. Other Issues
Additional factors contribute to the relative dearth of lawsuits for
domestic violence torts. In general, for a variety of reasons, relatively few
injured people seek compensation for their injuries, whatever the source of
those injuries.98 Many of those reasons apply with particular force to
domestic violence claims.99 Moreover, various factors specific to domestic
violence and domestic violence injuries ensure that the rate that victims
seek compensation for their injuries is almost certainly lower than the rate
that victims of other harms seek compensation.100
Overall, few injury victims seek recovery through the legal system
relative to the incidence of injury.101 Many potential plaintiffs who have
93. Dalton, supra note 4, at 363; Barbara Glesner Fines, Joinder of Tort Claims in Divorce
Actions, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 285, 298–300 (1994); Kristyn J. Krohse, Note, No
Longer Following the Rule of Thumb—What to Do with Domestic Torts and Divorce Claims, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 923, 923 (1997).
94. See supra Part II.C.3, infra Part II.C.5.
95. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 385–87.
96. See id. at 378.
97. See id. at 379–85.
98. See Saks, supra note 82, at 1185.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 101–08.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 101–20.
101. See Saks, supra note 82, at 1183. For example, a 1990 study concluded that in New York,
“eight times as many patients suffer an injury from medical negligence as there are malpractice claims.
Because only about half the claimants receive compensation, there are about sixteen times as many
patients who suffer an injury from negligence as there are persons who receive compensation through
the tort system.” Id. at 1183–84 (quoting HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS,
AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW

142

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:121

valid claims never assert their claims.102 The statistics contrasting the
number of suits filed with the incidence of domestic violence suggest that
this pattern holds true in the domestic violence context.103
One reason people do not bring claims is that they do not know that
they have a claim.104 This likely is a reason so few suits are brought for
domestic violence injuries even after a person escapes from an abuser.105
Moreover, unlike injuries from car accidents, for which people have grown
to expect compensation through a highly regulated insurance system,106
there is no such expectation of compensation for domestic violence
injuries.
People sometimes blame themselves for injuries caused by unsafe
products.107 Similarly, persons who are victimized by domestic violence
often blame themselves (and are blamed for it by their abusers).108 Thus, it
may not occur to a domestic violence victim to sue for a harm for which
she feels responsible.
One might be surprised that there are not more tort suits in connection
with divorce, given that divorce is an occasion where a victim would come
in contact with the legal system, and might have an attorney. Many people,
however, do not have attorneys in divorce; this is particularly true for
women.109 Women are much more likely to be victims of domestic
violence than are men.110 Even when a person injured by domestic
violence does have an attorney for her divorce, it is possible that the lawyer
dealing with the divorce does not even consider a tort case.111
Bringing a claim has costs, which “may include stigma associated
with the act of asserting a complaint, keeping the memory of the injury or
loss alive, or continued confrontation with the injurer, a distressing
YORK, THE REPORT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK 7-1
(1990)).
102. See Saks, supra note 82, at 1185.
103. See supra Part II.B.
104. See Saks, supra note 82, at 1188–89.
105. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 347–53.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 161–64.
107. See Saks, supra note 82, at 1188.
108. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 350–51.
109. See, e.g., Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of
State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 59 (1996) (citing gender bias studies of
state judicial systems finding that women, because of lack of funds, encounter special difficulties hiring
divorce attorneys).
110. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 321–22 n.2.
111. See Digges, supra note 62; Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 34, at 1292; Scherer, supra note
9, at 543.
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prospect for most victims.”112 The costs of domestic violence tort claims to
victims are much higher than for other kinds of tort claims. First, the injury
is caused by someone known by the victim. Continued confrontation with
the injurer is likely to be more distressing than when the injurer is a
manufacturer or a heretofore unknown driver.113 Second, for many
domestic abuse victims, there is a real and reasonable fear of violent
retaliation for the suit.114 The end of a relationship is the most dangerous
time for victims; filing a lawsuit is a way of demonstrating that the
relationship is indeed over and may result in serious and, in some instances,
fatal consequences.115 Third, if the parties are married and are not yet
divorced, a victim may rationally fear that the potential defendant will
assert retaliatory legal strategies in the divorce.116 Failure to raise the tort
claims in a divorce action may result in those claims being barred later.117
Thus, victims face a catch-22 and pressure to forego asserting tort claims.
Fourth, many people who have been in intimate relationships where they
have been victims of domestic violence torts simply wish to end the
abusive relationship and move on.118 Fifth, in civil rape cases in state
court, rape shield laws do not apply, which may discourage some injured
plaintiffs.119 The plaintiff might appear unsympathetic to a jury, so a
lawyer may advise against pursuing an otherwise meritorious claim.120 It is
112. Saks, supra note 82, at 1189.
113. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 200–02 (noting that trust is a foundation of family relationships
and that violation of trust by partner’s violence is a more egregious betrayal than random street
violence). See also Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger
Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV. 599, 604 (1991) (arguing that individuals who know each other should owe
each other a heightened duty of care).
114. See Atkins et al., supra note 50, at 85 (noting that when a survivor of domestic violence filed
suit for domestic abuse, the police department was notified and the plaintiff’s name was entered into the
computer system so that any call from her line would be acted on immediately); Ellman & Sugarman,
supra note 34, at 1293.
115. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 337–38; Mahoney, supra note 90, at 64–65. Moreover, a tort
lawsuit, which inevitably takes time to resolve, would not assist with many victims’ most immediate
needs for emergency expenses, such as changing locks, first and last month’s rent, crime scene cleanup,
and new bedding and furniture. Interview with Judith E. Beals, former Director, Massachusetts Victims
Compensation Board (Jan. 5, 2001).
116. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 34, at 1293.
117. See supra Part II.C.4.
118. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 34, at 1292.
119. See Casarino, supra note 35, at 198. Rape shield laws allow persons alleging rape to shield
their sexual history from cross-examination. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1975); FED. R. EV.
412; MASS. ANN. LAWS. CH. 233, § 21B. Civil defendants also lack some of the protections that
criminal defendants have. For example, civil defendants cannot refuse to take the stand and can only
refuse to answer questions that involve “criminally inculpatory” answers. See Casarino, supra note 35,
at 197–98.
120. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 34, at 1293.
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also possible that a victim may have injured the abuser, making a tort claim
on behalf of one likely to be answered with a valid counterclaim.
D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEARTH
1. Deterrence Consequences
Deterrence is one of the important justifications for tort liability.121
But since so few lawsuits are brought by domestic violence victims
compared to the harms committed, tort law is not an effective deterrent.
For tort liability to work as a deterrent, tort victims must have an
incentive to sue.122 Simply stated, if there is no (or virtually no) threat of
actual tort liability for certain conduct, then the tort system is providing no
deterrence of that conduct.
Debate persists about the extent to which the tort system actually
deters tortious behavior, but it is indisputably a goal of the system.123
121. See DOBBS, supra note 38, § 11 (“[A]nother aim of tort law is to deter certain kinds of
conduct by imposing liability when that conduct causes harm. The idea of deterrence is not so much
that an individual, having been held liable for a tort, would thereafter conduct himself better. It is rather
the idea that all persons, recognizing potential tort liability, would tend to avoid conduct that could lead
to tort liability.”); ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 17 (“[T]he influence of potential liability on behavior is
a central feature of certain economic rationales for tort liability. Properly imposed, tort liability is
supposed by these rationales to promote optimal deterrence.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 48,
§ 901 (noting that one of the “purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable” is “to punish
wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct”); Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance
Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (1997) (discouraging excessively dangerous
conduct by requiring injurers to pay for the costs of their behavior is one of the traditional goals of tort
law). See also Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1114 (1993) (noting that ex post regulation of car accidents through criminal liability is not as
effective as ex post regulation through civil liability because civil actions are more likely to be brought).
122. One of the reasons compensatory damages should be paid to victims directly (rather than to
the state) is “to give the victim an incentive to sue, which is essential to the maintenance of the tort
system as an effective, credible deterrent to negligence.” POSNER, supra note 12, at 191. The same
argument applies to victims of intentional torts.
123. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 82, passim (noting that goals of tort system include deterrence and
compensation but that available empirical evidence about the tort system’s actual behavior is
insufficient to evaluate its effectiveness at meeting goals); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381–90 (1994)
(summarizing different scholars’ viewpoints). Many tort theorists assert that tort liability deters unsafe
conduct. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 12, at 191; Arlen, supra note 121, at 1111 (criticizing no-fault
car accident proposal because it would lead to increased expected accident costs since motorists would
be more careless if they did not have to pay for other motorists’ accident costs). Others question this
assumption. See, e.g., SUGARMAN, supra note 13, at 21–23 (claiming that empirical evidence
supporting deterrence effects of tort law is not convincing). Economic theory is based on a model of
“man as a rational maximizer of his self-interest [which] implies that people respond to incentives.”
POSNER, supra note 12, at 4. This model assumes that tort liability affects behavior. See id. at 191. The
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Much of the literature is focused on accidents, rather than intentional torts,
and is grounded in economic theory.124 This literature rests on an
assumption that liability and the threat of liability affect behavior.125 This
Article likewise will assume that the threat of domestic violence tort
liability and domestic violence tort liability itself will affect behavior.
There is no theoretical reason why tort liability and the threat of liability
would lead to deterrence in the contexts of negligence and strict liability,
but not in the intentional tort context.
The economic literature also rests on the idea that tort rules should be
designed to lead to an optimal level of safety.126 The goal of an “optimal
level of safety” does not make much sense in the context of domestic
violence torts. Rather, the goal is that these torts do not take place at all,
even if that goal is unattainable.127 In economic terms, persons who
commit domestic violence torts externalize the costs of those acts; they do
not bear the costs of such acts.128 Far more domestic violence torts are
authors of a popular law and economics casebook acknowledge that deterrence relies on assumptions
that tort liability will deter: “Deterrence in tort law rests on the notion that placing liability on a
particular type of actor for past acts will deter similarly situated actors in the future.” DAVID W.
BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW 46 (1992). Recent scholarship
has noted limitations of the “rational self-interest maximizer” model and begun to replace it with a more
nuanced model grounded in behavioral psychology. See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, The Costs of
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163,
1181–1262; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
124. See, e.g., BARNES & STOUT, supra note 123; GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS
(3d ed. 2000); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12; POSNER, supra note 12. See generally Thomas C.
Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001) (highlighting accident-centered focus of
twentieth-century tort law).
125. See text and sources cited supra note 123.
126. According to economic analyses of accident law, the goal of tort law is to produce an optimal
level of precautions, not to prevent all accidents, which would be inefficient. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN,
supra note 12, at 197–201; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 1 (arguing that “the common law of
torts is best explained as if . . . judges . . . were trying to promote efficient resource allocation”);
POSNER, supra note 12, at 163–67. According to David Barnes and Lynn Stout, “Tort law may be
viewed as a system of rules designed to maximize wealth by allocating risks so as to minimize the costs
associated with engaging in daily activities.” BARNES & STOUT, supra note 123, at 27.
127. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 168–70 (noting that defendant’s cost of avoiding
harm in battery and assault cases is negative while victim’s cost is higher; battery and assault liability
rules make economic sense); POSNER, supra note 12, at 210 (spitting in someone’s face is not wealthmaximizing or lawful, even if the utility to the spitter is greater than the harm caused to the person spat
upon). Since much of the literature focuses exclusively on accidents, and implicitly defines torts as
dealing only with accidents, this tort goal is rarely discussed. See Grey, supra note 124, at 1226 (noting
that tort law is centered on accidents). See also infra note 370.
128. Externalities are “social benefits or costs that are not translated into market signals.”
ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 16. See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 124, at 290 (“Economists
describe harms that are outside private agreements as externalities. The economic purpose of tort
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committed than would be if the costs were internalized, or borne, by the
tortfeasors.129 Tort law is failing mightily in its deterrence goal.
2. Compensation Consequences
Compensation130 is another central purpose of tort law.131 One clear
consequence of the dearth of lawsuits is that compensation is not received
through the tort system. Compensation paid to victims of domestic
violence from sources outside the tort system is piecemeal or wholly
inadequate. Victims may have first-party insurance such as health
insurance to cover some medical expenses from their injuries. As of Fall
2000, however, over 38 million Americans did not have health
insurance.132 Moreover, medical insurers have declined to issue health,
life, and disability insurance policies to domestic violence victims.133
Disability insurance may provide some lost wages if a victim of domestic
liability is to induce injurers to internalize these costs. Tort law internalizes these costs by making the
injurer compensate the victim.”).
129. Thus, domestic violence torts are inefficient. According to Kenneth Abraham’s nontechnical
definition, which will be used here, “an allocation [of resources] is efficient when resources are used in
a manner that maximizes their value.” ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 10. This concept might seem to fit
uneasily with domestic violence torts, except when one remembers that there is no efficiency
justification for domestic violence torts like assault and battery. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12,
at 168–71; POSNER, supra note 12, at 210. By definition, in economic terms, assaulting someone or
committing other domestic violence torts uses resources in a manner that does not maximize their value.
130. For a definition of compensation, see supra note 13. See also Croley & Hanson, supra note
13, at 1835 (suggesting that there is consumer demand for pain and suffering damages); Feldman, supra
note 121, at 1570 (arguing that individualized pain and suffering damages are an important part of the
tort system’s way of “making victims whole”).
131. As Dan Dobbs notes in his hornbook:
[C]ompensation of injured persons is one of the generally accepted aims of tort law. Payment
of compensation to injured persons is desirable . . . compensation is also socially desirable,
for otherwise the uncompensated injured persons will represent further costs and problems for
society. . . Injury costs are socially as well as individually significant. . . . Compensation for
injury may actually help reduce personal injury costs. Appropriate medical attention, for
example, may allow an injured person to return to work sooner. Injury also has ripple effects,
especially when it promotes economic hardship. Children and others within a family stressed
by serious injury and consequent economic difficulty may reflect that stress by inflicting still
further economic costs upon society, for example, by abusing alcohol or drugs.
DOBBS, supra note 38, § 10. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 48, § 901 (stating that one
of the “purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable” is “to give compensation, indemnity or
restitution for harms”); Feldman, supra note 121, at 1570 (noting that making victims whole is one
traditional tort law goal).
132. Robert Pear, Number of Uninsured Drops for 2nd Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at A19.
Medical insurance often requires copayments that the insured must pay, may have reimbursement caps,
and does not necessarily cover all expenses.
133. See Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A Case Study
in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 355–56 (1997); Sherri A. Mullikin,
Note, A Cost Analysis Approach to Determining the Reasonableness of Using Domestic Violence as an
Insurance Classification, 25 J. LEGIS. 195 (1999).
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violence loses work as a result of her injuries. Long-term disability
insurance, however, is not widespread.134 While victims compensation
funds, in theory, could provide significant compensation, in practice, only a
small fraction of expended victims compensation funds go to domestic
violence victims.135
The costs of these domestic violence torts, financial and nonfinancial,
are borne largely by the victims, but also by their children and their
employers.136 In addition to direct out-of-pocket expenses, lost wages and
pain and suffering, domestic violence also imposes broad costs on society.
Some of these costs were detailed in the dissent in U.S. v. Morrison:137
“Partial estimates show that violent crime against women costs this
country at least 3 billion—not million, but billion—dollars a year.”138
“[E]stimates suggest that we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health
care, criminal justice, and other social costs of domestic violence.”139
“[A]s many as 50 percent of homeless women and children are fleeing
domestic violence.”140
“Since 1974, the assault rate against women has outstripped the rate
for men by at least twice for some age groups and far more for others.”141
“Between 2,000 and 4,000 women die every year from [domestic]
abuse.”142
The harm goes largely uncompensated.143
134. Approximately 22% of the working population has long-term disability insurance. See
Abraham & Liebman, supra note 17, at 81–82. Moreover, disability insurance does not fully cover lost
wages. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1901 (noting that disability policies require greater
copayments in general than health insurance policies).
135. See Desmond S. Greer, A Transatlantic Perspective on the Compensation of Crime Victims
in the United States, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 348 (1994).
136. See id. at 387 (noting that costs of domestic violence are borne largely by victims and their
employers). Some of the costs are already shared more widely through first-party medical insurance.
See generally Hellman, supra note 133 (addressing medical insurance companies’ treatment of
domestic violence victims). For those without private insurance Medicaid covers some of the medical
costs, and Temporary Aid to Needy Families covers some of the living expenses of people who cannot
support their children. These are publicly funded and thus some cost sharing occurs through taxation.
137. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 631 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 632 (citing S.REP. NO. 101-545, at 33).
139. Id. at 632–33 (citing S.REP. NO. 103-138, at 41).
140. Id. at 631 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 37).
141. Id. at 631–32 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 30).
142. Id. at 632 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 36).
143. For discussion of the term “compensation,” see supra note 13. One article on the civil rights
remedy provision of VAWA claims that there is no compensation problem. Judge William Bassler
claims that there is no “evidence that significant numbers of women are not being compensated . . . for
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3. Other Consequences
Tort law “plays a narrative and declarative role for individual litigants
and for the culture at large.”144 Like other areas of law, tort law has
important expressive and rhetorical functions:
Law . . . tells stories about the culture that helped to shape it, and which
it in turn helps to shape . . . . Indeed, it may be that law affects our lives
at least as much by these stories as it does by the specific rules,
standards, institutions, and procedures of which it is composed.145

It is important to explore the stories that the tort system is telling.
The extensive harm caused by domestic violence, coupled with the
lack of tort deterrence or compensation of that harm, tells a story that the
activity is acceptable in at least one particular sense—it reflects what
Holmes termed “[T]he general principle of our law . . . that loss . . . must
lie where it falls.”146 Only if there is a “clear benefit . . . from disturbing
the status quo” should losses be shifted.147 The harm plus the lack of
compensation, in effect says, to use Holmes’ words, that there is no “clear
benefit . . . to be derived from . . . [changing] the status quo.”148 These
implicit assumptions can be challenged. The status quo is unacceptable, as
feminist analysis has shown.149 Legal arrangements, including torts and
insurance bars to enforcement, play an active role in constituting the status
quo.150 Shifting the losses caused by domestic violence from the individual
harmed by it to the perpetrator and the society at large is imperative.
assaults motivated by anti-female prejudice.” William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic
Violence: An Exercise in Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?,
48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1139, 1169 (1996). This claim is puzzling, since it is so clear that women are not
compensated in significant numbers for domestic violence injuries, as few tort suits are brought. See
Scherer, supra note 9, at 565; supra Part II.B. Furthermore, only a small proportion of victims
compensation funds go to domestic violence victims. See Greer, supra note 135, at 348. Perhaps
Bassler is saying that it is not clear that domestic violence injuries are motivated by anti-female
prejudice, so that the lack of compensation for those injuries is not significant. But whether or not the
assaults are motivated by anti-female prejudice, it is clear that women are not being compensated for
these assaults.
144. Pryor, supra note 10, at 1748.
145. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES,
EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 8 (1987). See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON
THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985).
146. HOLMES, supra note 14, at 76.
147. Id. at 77.
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 2; DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2; text
accompanying notes 136–43.
150. See supra Part II.C. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and
Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING ETC. 92, 124 (1993) (arguing that background legal rules have
distributive and normative consequences); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
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Law is telling various inconsistent stories about domestic violence.
Domestic violence is no longer invisible to law in the way that it once
was.151 In every state, victims can obtain civil protection orders that are
enforceable by criminal penalties.152 There is now an extensive network of
shelters for women injured and threatened by domestic violence.153 State
and federal criminal charges can be, and sometimes are, brought for
domestic assaults and stalking.154 Divorce, if the parties are married, can
sever the legal relationship between them. In bankruptcy law, discharge is
not available for certain intentional tort judgments,155 sending a message
that these torts are serious. But the many roadblocks that prevent delivery
of this message in the domestic violence tort context send their own
message: tort deterrence and compensation are unimportant.156
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (noting that family is not separate from the
market and legal rules constitute family, rather than family constituting separate realm).
151. See generally Siegel, supra note 36 (analyzing history of law concerning wife-beating and
showing how changes in formal legal rules may lead to reinforcing of status relationships in a different
form).
152. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810–11 (1993).
153. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 21, 182 (describing development of shelter network).
154. In addition to state criminal laws, VAWA contained several criminal provisions. See supra
note 6. Elizabeth Schneider notes that many woman who are battered, for a variety of reasons, refuse to
press charges. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 184–85. For materials discussing issues in domestic
violence prosecutions, see DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 528–55.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 523(6) (1999) (providing that debts “for willful and malicious injury by the
debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity cannot” be discharged in bankruptcy).
156. Relatively little of the rich body of feminist legal scholarship on domestic violence focuses
on the tort aspects of domestic violence. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Epilogue: Making
Reconceptualization of Violence Against Women Real, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1246–48 nn.4–6 (1995)
(listing legal scholarship). For work that deals with tort aspects of domestic violence, see, for example,
Dalton, supra note 4; Scherer, supra note 9; Weiner, supra note 7, at 189 (arguing that for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, a per se standard should be applied to satisfy the
“outrageousness” requirement when a defendant violates an injunction issued to protect the plaintiff).
The civil rights remedy of VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, provided a mechanism for potential
compensation for some domestic violence injuries, but the scholarship endorsing the remedy provision
did not focus directly on compensation. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence:
Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 123 (1999)
(discussing analogies to civil rights law as a guide to interpretation of VAWA civil rights remedy
provision). The criminal provisions of VAWA are paired with a mandatory restitution provision. See
18 U.S.C. § 2248 (2000). This requires courts to order, in addition to other penalties, a range of types
of compensation. This includes medical expenses, transportation, temporary housing and child care,
attorneys fees, and other costs. See id. This obviously evidences a focus on compensation, albeit in the
context of criminal prosecution. The laws providing for civil protection orders in most states provide
for the possibility of some economic relief in a protection order. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 152, at
993. In civil protection proceedings, however, judges routinely turn down requests for monetary relief.
See id. at 992.
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This is particularly striking when one examines insurance and
compensation schemes for other widespread losses and attention paid by
scholars and legislators to deterrence and compensation in other
contexts.157 Society certainly does not provide compensation plans for all
losses or injuries.158 But some types of loss are deemed worthy enough
that scholars and legislators create markets and forge systematic
compensation plans.159 Workers compensation, for example, was instituted
in response to the “initially staggering” problem of uninsured workplace
injuries and is now a massive system that provides compensation for
employees who suffer work-related injuries.160 Injuries sustained in
automobile accidents are addressed in almost all states by insurance that
drivers must purchase and insurers must provide.161 Moreover, uninsured
motorist coverage is required in many states so that people injured by
uninsured motorists can receive compensation.162 Government-subsidized
157. Regarding cigarettes, see. e.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 123, at 1187–88 (1998). For
example, a 1993 symposium on “Future Prospects for Compensation Systems” focused on
compensation for accidents from cars, toxic materials, industry and medical treatment. Symposium,
Future Prospects For Compensation Systems, 52 MD. L. REV. 893 (1993). Similarly, a 1985
symposium on “Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory” did not deal with harm from
intentional torts. Symposium, Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CAL. L. REV.
548 (1985). Extensive legislation exists in every state concerning workers compensation and
automobile insurance. See 9 Russ & Segalla, supra note 67, §§ 133:1, 133:5.
158. See generally Abraham & Liebman, supra note 17, at 80.
159. As Keeton & Widiss note, “[t]he undesirable social consequences of uninsured losses have
given rise to proposals in many contexts for governmental participation in various types of insurance
arrangements.” KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 8.6(e). An example of this is statutorily mandated
high-risk auto insurance plans. See id. § 8.6(f) (noting that the problem of unwanted insureds is dealt
with through mandatory, assigned risk plans in which private insurers participate). For example, the
Maine assigned risk statute reads in part: “Every insurer undertaking to transact in this State the
business of automobile and motor vehicle bodily injury, property damage liability, physical damage and
medical payments insurance . . . shall cooperate in the preparation and submission of a plan for the
equitable apportionment among insurers of applicants for insurance who are in good faith entitled to,
but who are unable to procure through ordinary methods, such insurance.” 24-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 2325 (2000).
160. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 8.6(e). See generally 9 Russ & Segalla, supra note
67, § 133:2; Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform,” 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 657 (1998). Some observers claim that this insurance does not undermine deterrence
incentives. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 17 (noting that some observers claim that workers
compensation does not impede optimal deterrence).
161. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 219. Abraham notes:
the current emphasis on various kinds of residual markets in the automobile insurance field
reveals a great deal about the centrality of the automobile in our culture. The use of an
automobile at a tolerable cost has become almost a fundamental right; the maintenance of
residual markets that assure all drivers minimum insurance follows from and reflects this
development.
Id.
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property insurance programs for inner-city properties have been developed
in most states.163 Similarly, in each state there is a high-risk automobile
insurance pool which must insure people who are otherwise uninsurable.164
The basic idea behind these plans is that the social harm of not having the
plan outweighs the burden of having the plan. Yet, for domestic violence
victims and victims of other intentional torts there is no meaningful, let
alone comparable, compensation system. This disparity sends the message
that some injuries are more worthy of compensation than others.165 There
is no reason why, in a society with a “civilized system of justice,”166 the
injuries of a person who is hurt in a car accident should be treated as more
worthy of compensation than the injuries of a person who is hurt by a
spouse or intimate partner.
162. See ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE §2.5 at 29–30
(2d ed. 1999) (noting that eighteen states mandate purchase of uninsured motorist coverage; remainder
of states require that uninsured motorist coverage be offered to motorists).
163. Government insurance programs have been instituted that require insurance companies to
provide coverage in certain areas, namely inner city neighborhoods, that they otherwise would not be
willing to insure. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 8.6(c)(5). These plans, known as Fair
Access to Insurance Requirements (“FAIR”) Plans, exist in twenty-nine states. See Willy E. Rice,
Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An
Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State
Courts, 1950–1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 613 n.124 (1996). See generally Regina Austin, The
Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (1983); John Hugh Gilmore, Note:
Insurance Redlining & the Fair Housing Act: The Lost Opportunity of Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance
Companies, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 563 (1985).
164. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 8.6(f). For example, the Maine assigned risk statute
reads in part:
Every insurer undertaking to transact in this State the business of automobile and motor
vehicle bodily injury, property damage liability, physical damage and medical payments
insurance . . . shall cooperate in the preparation and submission of a plan for the equitable
apportionment among insurers of applicants for insurance who are in good faith entitled to,
but who are unable to procure through ordinary methods, such insurance.
24-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2325 (2000).
165. See generally Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 864 (1990) (arguing through historical examples that “courts
and commentators [from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s] used injuries associated with men as
the dominant standard for determining legal value . . . [which] had the effect of devaluing injuries
associated with women, albeit expressed differently in different historical periods”).
166. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). The phrase is from Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion, where he notes that if Brzonkala’s claims are true, “no civilized system of justice
could fail to provide her a remedy for the conduct of respondent Morrison.” Id. She alleged that he
raped her shortly after meeting her. See id. at 602.
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III. CONSTRUCTING A MORE EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORT LIABILITY
A. INSURANCE REFORM:
LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS AND
“UNINSURED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTFEASOR” INSURANCE
1. Introduction
This Section will begin by reviewing the essential features of the
proposed “Domestic Violence Torts Insurance Plan,” paying special
attention to the uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor feature of the
plan.167 It will then discuss why pricing the insurance is viable,168 why it
should be a mandatory part of automobile insurance,169 and possible
objections to the plan.170
2. The “Domestic Violence Torts Insurance Plan”
a. In General
The proposed plan of liability insurance for domestic violence torts
would look like this: mandatory automobile liability insurance would
include a required minimum amount of coverage for domestic violence
torts, so that if a policyholder is sued for such a tort, the automobile policy
would cover the claim to the minimum.171 In the case of a jointly owned
automobile, the policy would cover a policyholder for a liability claim by
The policy would contain reimbursement
another policyholder.172
provisions for domestic violence torts, so that the insurance company could
seek reimbursement from a policyholder for amounts it pays out for
domestic violence tort claims.173 In addition, mandatory automobile
167. See infra Part III.A.2.
168. See infra Part III.A.3.
169. See infra Part III.A.4.
170. See infra Part III.A.5.
171. The policy would have a deductible so that some less serious claims would be weeded out.
Individuals could purchase higher liability limits if they chose.
172. The policy would not contain a family member exclusion, unlike many automobile and
homeowners policies. See infra Part III.A.5.a.
173. If property is jointly held between the insured defendant and the plaintiff seeking
compensation or if the property is marital property, this can create problematic scenarios. One example
is a situation where a plaintiff sues a defendant and recovers judgment from the insurance company.
The plaintiff and defendant are not married but own a house together in which they live. The insurance
company seeks reimbursement from the defendant, which results in liens placed on the house and its
eventual sale, so that the insurance company is reimbursed. The plaintiff ends up with funds from the
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insurance would include a required minimum amount of coverage,
somewhat analogous to uninsured motorist coverage.174 Under this
coverage, where an insured is a victim of a domestic violence tort, and the
defendant is uninsured, the victim can make a claim under the “uninsured
domestic violence tortfeasor” section of the policy. The insured’s
insurance company could then seek reimbursement from the uninsured
defendant, imposing costs on the defendant.
b. More on “Uninsured Domestic Violence Tortfeasor” Insurance
This Subsection will explain the idea of “Uninsured Domestic
Violence Tortfeasor” Insurance and why it is particularly appropriate that
this coverage apply to domestic violence torts. To present the proposal for
“uninsured assailant” coverage, it is necessary to first provide basic
information concerning uninsured motorist coverage. “Uninsured motorist
coverage” is the part of auto coverage that allows compensation from the
policyholder’s insurance company if the policyholder is injured by a driver
who is uninsured, or by a hit-and-run driver.175 Recovery under existing
uninsured motorist policies is not limited to harm caused by negligent acts
of an uninsured tortfeasor, but also covers intentional torts of an uninsured
tortfeasor.176 The language of standard uninsured motorist policies applies
only to injuries caused by accidents.177 In practice, however, injuries
caused by the intentional acts of an uninsured motorist generally are
covered because the injury-causing event is viewed from the perspective of
the victim, not the perpetrator.178 Thus, injury caused by a tortfeasor’s
intentional, and even deliberate acts, is covered.
judgment but no house. The defendant ends up with no house. Another scenario is a fraudulent claim
where a husband and wife concoct a tort and damages and share the proceeds. Another scenario is
where a controlling batterer commits the tort and then takes the proceeds. Obviously, fraud and
collusion would be forbidden under the policy, and insurers would attempt to root it out. Another
scenario is where a claim is brought and resolved during a marriage and the plaintiff and defendant later
get divorced; the award the plaintiff received could be marital property. State legislation defining
marital property as not including settlements or judgments from domestic violence torts could resolve
this. These scenarios are troubling, and others can be imagined, but there is no perfect solution. For
cases dealing with the dilemma of an estranged spouse burning down the house that was owned by the
couple, see Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 980 P.2d 685 (Utah 1999) (declaring as valid and
consistent with public policy an exclusion barring innocent spouse’s recovery for property damage);
Watson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1997) (ruling that exclusion barring
innocent spouse’s recovery for property damage is illegal under state statute).
174. See infra Part III.A.5.b.
175. See generally WIDISS, supra note 162.
176. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 5.4(c)(3).
177. Standard uninsured motorist policies state that the insurer shall pay all sums “that an insured
is ‘legally entitled to recover as damages . . . because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused
by accident.’” Id. (emphasis in original).
178. See id.
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There are several reasons why it is appropriate to adopt the viewpoint
of the injured party:
from the perspective of the injured person (and especially so when an
assault, using a motor vehicle, was not provoked by that person), the
cause of the injuries is no less fortuitous than in the situation in which a
person is injured as a result of the negligent operation of an uninsured
vehicle.179

Furthermore, payments under uninsured motorist coverage do not
undermine the goals of tort liability or insurance.180 Courts generally have
allowed compensation even though actions that caused the injury were
intended by the uninsured motorist.181 So, too, in the domestic violence
context: the harm caused may be intentional from the perspective of the
perpetrator, but not intentional from the perspective of the injured
person.182 The policy can be written, as uninsured motorist policies are, to
provide that the insurance company can seek reimbursement from the
tortfeasor.183
179. Id.
180. Id. § 5.4(c)(3), at 516.
181. See id. Keeton & Widiss list several other reasons why it is appropriate to view the event
from the perspective of the insured: the tortfeasor does not benefit from the coverage and the insurance
company can seek reimbursement for the payments it makes from the tortfeasor; payments made under
uninsured motorist policies “do not reduce the possibility that either the tort system or the criminal law
system will operate either to punish or to influence the conduct either of the tortfeasor who caused the
loss which is indemnified by the insurance or of other potential tortfeasors”; the passage of uninsured
motorist coverage in many states demonstrates the importance of providing indemnification to motorists
injured by financially irresponsible motorists; and “providing indemnification to insureds under the
uninsured motorist coverage is also warranted because a tort action is likely to yield little, if any,
compensation, even though such a tortfeasor, if financially responsible, would be liable for an
intentional tort.” Id. at 515.
182. Part of the contribution of feminist theory to law is the effort to shift perspectives in law so
that the perspective of those with less power is included and that women’s perspectives and
subjectivities are taken seriously in law. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237–39 (1989). By looking at intentional harm from the perspective
of the victim, this aspect of insurance law is an interesting example of a feminist approach to the
problem of intentional harm. One concern is that the analogy to uninsured motorist coverage for
intentional acts seems to call for an analysis of whether the violence was “provoked.” See KEETON &
WIDISS, supra note 21, § 5.4(c)(3) (stating that it as appropriate to cover intentional harm under an
uninsured motorist policy if the attack was not “provoked”). This analysis would be undertaken
initially by insurance companies in determining whether there was coverage, and then by courts if there
were coverage disputes. Feminist scholarship has articulated a comprehensive critique of patriarchal
domestic violence ideologies including the ideology that “she asked for it” or provoked it. See
Hellman, supra note 133, at 362–77 (arguing that health insurance should not be denied to battered
women who “stay” in a violent relationship); Mahoney, supra note 90, at 78–93 (discussing concept of
separation assault); SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 79–86 (noting that in situations where battered women
killed their assailants, myths that battered women were “provocative” made these women seem
especially unreasonable, and calling for a recognition of the complexities of agency).
183. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 5.4(c)(3).
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3. Pricing the Insurance
Pricing the insurance is a threshold requirement for the plan to be
viable. Insurance is “a method of managing risk by distributing it among
large numbers of individuals or enterprises.”184 “Risk” is “the possibility
of injury or loss.”185 Insureds agree, through contracts, to pay the insurer a
fee, or premium, based on their expected losses.186 “Expected loss” is the
“probability of a loss [over a given time period] multiplied by the amount
of the loss if it occurs.”187 Insureds are divided into groups according to
their risk of loss, so that each member of the group faces roughly the same
risk of loss.188 The insurer agrees to provide funds to compensate the
insureds who actually experience a loss.189 Insurance must be priced close
to the insured’s expected loss for insurance companies to function and to
further efficiency.190
Given the considerable knowledge about domestic violence, it should
be possible to calculate insureds’ expected losses and thus price insurance
for it. Research on domestic violence, including its incidence, has
184. ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 1–2. Another formulation states that it is an “arrangement for
transferring and distributing risks.” KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21. There is no one, concise,
universally applicable definition of insurance. See id.
185. ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 2.
186. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1793.
187. ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 11. Insurance premiums, in a perfectly competitive market,
would consist of the expected loss plus administrative costs, and a profit. See id. at 13. Expected loss,
however, can be difficult to calculate and other factors may interfere with the goal of pricing in
accordance with expected loss. See id. at 67–69.
188. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1793.
189. See id.
190. ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 12. If insureds’ actual losses exceed the expected losses, the
insurance company will lose money. Writing about efficient the pricing of insurance, Abraham notes
that “if [insurance] is underpriced . . . I may purchase more insurance than I would otherwise: I will
underallocate to prevention and overallocate to insurance.” Id. Similarly, if insurance pricing is not
sensitive to claims history, it may undermine deterrence incentives. See id. at 46. This would apply to
insurance for intentional torts as well as accidents. Pricing insurance in accordance with expected loss
is important to economic efficiency, but promoting efficiency is not the sole purpose of insurance law.
See id. at 18. Normative issues inevitably arise regarding what constitutes a fair distribution of risk. To
illustrate some of these issues, Abraham uses the example of an imaginary ethnic group, the Claudians,
that are more prone to falling in bathtubs than other groups.
Concern for efficiency alone would dictate that Claudians be charged more than other people
for bathtub-fall insurance, if there were such a thing. Some might argue, however, that this
extra risk should not be borne by Claudians because not all Claudians are prone to falling,
those who do fall have no control over their falls, or singling out a specific ethnic group for
such treatment unfairly discriminates against it. These are arguments for redistributing risk so
that Claudians as a group do not bear all the risk that they actually pose.
Id. at 19. See infra text accompanying notes 197–201.
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exploded in recent decades. Systematic research has begun to analyze risk
factors for domestic violence.191
Some observers may argue that insurance for any intentionally caused
harm, including harm that caused by domestic violence torts, cannot be
accurately priced because the losses are not probabilistic in nature.192
Liability insurance, however, is not limited to coverage for harms that are
produced unintentionally. Insurance is provided in some circumstances for
punitive damages, for example, which often are awarded for intentional
conduct.193 Insurance has developed over the last decade for employers
covering their liability for their employees’ intentional acts such as sexual
harassment.194 As new forms of liability emerge, insurance often
follows.195 Despite early challenges in pricing employers’ liability
insurance, this insurance has become widely available.196 It should also be
possible to determine prices for the insurance proposed here.
Pricing insurance involves classifying insureds into groups, each
member of which faces a similar risk of loss.197 Decisions as to the
composition of the groups often raise complex and controversial issues of
fairness, as has been seen in debates over gender, race, and insurance.198
191. See, e.g., Kyriacou et al., supra note 1.
192. Priest raises one such argument:
Insurance operates where losses have some . . . probabilistic character. . . . For a loss or a set
of losses to be probabilistic means that the occurrence of the loss or set can be described by a
probability distribution. . . . The [intentional acts exclusion] represents an obvious effort to
constrain insurance to probabilistic risks. If the insured knows or expects that a particular
occurrence will happen, the loss caused by the occurrence cannot be said to be probabilistic,
and, thus, cannot be effectively insured.
Priest, supra note 69, at 1020–25. Likewise, Ellen Pryor states “[h]arms that insureds produce
intentionally, unlike accidental harms, generally do not follow the law of large numbers that makes it
possible for insurers to aggregate and predict the expected losses posed by a pool of insureds.” Pryor,
supra note 10, at 1740.
193. See Baker, supra note 10, at 120 n.66; Priest, supra note 69, at 1009.
194. See Klenk, supra note 15.
195. See id. at 330. As noted above, sometimes the process happens in reverse; insurance
coverage predates liability. See Syverud, supra note 66, at 1115.
196. See Klenk, supra note 15, at 325. See generally Symposium, Employment Practices Liability
Insurance and the Changing American Workplace, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245 (1999). Insurance
company literature uses as a selling point the fact that the insurance covers intentional acts. See, e.g.,
Amity Insurance Agency Employment Practices Liability Insurance (emphaisizing employment
practices liability insurance has no exclusion for intentional acts and covers punitive damages),
available at http://www.amityinsurance.com/eplinsur.htm (last visited Jul. 10, 2001); Florida Police
Chiefs Association, FPCA Buyer’s Guide: Municipal Insurance (noting that insurance provides
coverage for intentional acts and also “responds to the punitive damages issue”), available at
http://www.fpca.com/pfcsifcoverage.htm (last visited Jul. 10, 2001).
197. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1793.
198. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 18–31, 64–100; Austin, supra note 163; Hellman, supra
note 133, at 378–79.
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One approach to challenging the way that risk is allocated by the private
market is to argue for more risk spreading in general.199 There may be a
danger that insurance companies will form classifications that are
discriminatory in some unacceptable way, which may lead to regulation.200
Debates about fairness in risk distribution are inevitable and endemic to
private insurance schemes.201 They do not undermine the basic point that
pricing insurance for domestic violence torts should be practical.
4. Reasons for a Mandatory Plan
There are three reasons the coverage should be mandatory. First,
persons considering whether to voluntarily purchase this insurance are
likely to underestimate their risk of inflicting or suffering domestic
violence torts.202 This means that relatively few people would purchase the
insurance, which would make it prohibitively expensive. Second, if
purchase of the insurance were voluntary, it is likely that the problem of
adverse selection203 would arise. Only those who needed it most would
purchase it, which would result in an unacceptably high number of claims.
Therefore, if the insurance were purely voluntary, the market for it would
likely fail. Third, domestic violence torts are so pervasive and damaging
that drastic steps need to be taken to address them as a matter of fairness.204
Coverage should be part of automobile insurance because a problem of this
magnitude demands a broad solution. Because automobile insurance is
more pervasive than homeowners insurance, mandating domestic violence
insurance in car insurance would spread the risk more broadly than if the
insurance was marketed with homeowners insurance.205
199. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 19. Another approach is to argue for redistributing risk
between individuals and groups. See id.
200. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 64–100; Austin, supra note 163; Hellman, supra
note 133; Mulliken, supra note 133; Rice, supra note 163. It is not the purpose of this Article to
propose a detailed scheme of risk distribution; this Article argues for a broader spreading of risk in
general.
201. See supra note 175.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 206–13.
203. Adverse selection refers to the problem of people who are disproportionately likely to
experience an insured-against event having the tendency to buy insurance for that event. See Baker,
supra note 10, at 121. This leads to a heightened number of claims and increased costs. Id. See infra
Part III.A.4.b.
204. As explained above, current law leaves the costs of domestic violence largely on its victims;
tort law is not deterring or compensating in this area. See supra Part II.D.
205. Another option would be to include domestic violence insurance as a mandatory part of
homeowners’ policies. But given that a large fraction of the population does not own a home and that
homeowners insurance is not required once a mortgage has been paid off, see supra notes 70, 78–80,
this idea would spread risk much more narrowly than if the insurance was attached to automobile
insurance.
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a. Imperfect Information
People generally are poor risk-estimators. A growing body of
research shows that people commonly underestimate or overestimate the
likelihood of uncertain events and the costs of such events.206 Research has
not been published specifically on individuals’ estimates of the probability
that they will be a victim or perpetrator of domestic violence. It is
reasonable to conclude, however, that people estimate their risks of being a
victim or perpetrator of domestic violence torts as much lower than it is.
There is a documented “third person” effect with smokers; smokers may
overestimate the risks of smoking in general but underestimate the risks of
smoking to them personally.207 Similarly, members of a couple may be
aware of or even overestimate the incidence of domestic violence, but may
underestimate the risks to them of being a victim or perpetrator. This
seems particularly likely in the domestic violence context since it often
involves affectional attachments and changes in people over a long period
of time.208 An even more closely related example is research showing that
one hundred percent of couples about to marry dismiss the possibility of
divorce.209 If insurance is voluntary, it seems likely that few people will
purchase it. Moreover, in cases where the domestic violence perpetrator
controls the finances and purchases of the household, it is very unlikely that
any domestic violence tort insurance would be purchased. Thus, insurance
markets would not be able to function, leading to market failure.
206. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1845–48 (noting that individuals do not possess
enough information to enter into a reasonably well-specified insurance contract for pain-and-suffering
damages); Hanson & Logue, supra note 123, at 1186–87 (pointing out that consumers may
overestimate the dangers of smoking in general but underestimate the health risks of smoking for them
personally); Jolls et al., supra note 123, at 1518–19 (reviewing research showing that people routinely
underestimate or overestimate the risk of environmental and other harms depending on “the observed
frequency of the hazard and its salience”); Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the
Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91, 143 n.152
(1993) (citing research showing that people make “systematic errors in judgments about the future” and
noting that because of the invisibility of disabled people, non-disabled individuals may “underestimate
the likelihood of disability”); Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws,
77 VA. L. REV. 489, 524–30 (1991) (suggesting that people underestimate the costs of low probability,
high loss events and so may not buy optimal amounts of insurance); Wortham, supra note 70, at 861–74
(noting that people are generally unskilled at estimating risk).
207. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 123, at 1186–88 (describing the “third-party effect” in the
smoking context).
208. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 336 (noting that women do not fall in love with men who are
initially abusive—the abuse develops over time).
209. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443
(1993) (reporting that 100% of people about to marry believe they will not get divorced).
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While there is little insurance for domestic violence tort liability, this
does not mean that there is no demand for it or that there never will be
demand. Taking the broader example of demand for intentional acts
insurance, it may be that there is no such insurance because there is no
demand for it.210 As Jon Hanson and Steven Croley have shown, however,
insurance markets do not necessarily reflect consumer preferences.211
People may not demand insurance for domestic violence injuries or claims
because they are not injuries or claims against which one can generally
insure.212 The demand for third-party insurance is somewhat circular.
Because claims are not brought, there is no perception of a need for such
insurance that such claims might create. The same is true for uninsured
domestic violence tortfeasor insurance. There is no expectation of
compensation, and thus no demand for insurance.213 Further education
about the probability of committing or suffering domestic violence might
help create demand. But definitive conclusions about future demand
cannot be reached based on the current situation.
b. Adverse Selection
The phenomenon of adverse selection suggests that people who are
most likely to need a particular kind of insurance are the most likely to buy
it, which leads to insurers paying an economically unacceptable number of
claims.214 If coverage were voluntary, it is possible that people most likely
210. See Pryor, supra note 10, at 1741 (noting that “consumer choice might go far in explaining
the basic exclusion for intentionally produced bodily harm or property damage”). See also Priest, supra
note 13, at 1547 (arguing insurance markets reflect consumer demand).
211. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1835–95. See also Wortham, supra note 70, at
861–74 (noting that the insurance market does not reflect predictions of economic theory, including
predictions that people do not make rational insurance purchase decisions and are unskilled at
probabilistic thinking).
212. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1836 n.157 (arguing that lack of availability of firstparty insurance for pain-and-suffering damages is an important factor in the lack of demand for such
insurance); Pryor, supra note 206, at 144 (“[A] person’s lack of desire for a good or opportunity may
result from her perception that it will be denied to her.”).
213. The idea that the insurance market reflects the demands of the sovereign consumer is
undermined by the development of uninsured motorist coverage. According to the leading treatise on
uninsured motorist coverage:
one of the most important things to remember [about uninsured motorist coverage] is that the
coverage terms have been almost entirely developed privately by the insurance industry . . . in
response to significant pressures for changes in the accident compensation system (so that
accident victims would be assured a source of indemnification) and as a means of averting
possibly more extensive modifications in the then existing automobile compensation
system. . . . [T]he public did not directly influence the terms of the coverage.
WIDISS, supra note 162, § 1.14, at 18.
214. For a definition of adverse selection, see supra note 203 and accompanying text. As Croley
& Hanson note in the context of insurance for nonpecuniary loss:
Adverse selection occurs because individuals who know in advance either that they are more
likely than others to suffer some nonpecuniary loss, or that their nonpecuniary losses would
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to cause or suffer domestic violence torts would be most likely to purchase
the insurance, therefore driving the price up, perhaps to economically
unacceptable levels.215 If purchase of the coverage was part of the already
mandatory car insurance, however, adverse selection would not be a
significant problem.216
c. Fairness
The costs of domestic violence torts currently are unfairly distributed:
They fall almost exclusively on the victims, their employers, and their
families. Neither the torts system nor insurance markets are cushioning the
blows to individuals by spreading the risk, as they could and should. This
is a major social problem and the status quo is unacceptable. Law should
promote sharing of the risks and costs of domestic violence torts in view of
the enormous, society-wide nature of this problem.217
The question may arise as to why this plan should be limited to
domestic violence torts and why all intentional torts should not also be
included. The response is normative. The problem of domestic violence
torts is epidemic.218 Feminist legal scholarship has shown the importance
of domestic violence.219 In view of the magnitude and extent of domestic
violence, public policy supports limiting the insurance plan proposed above
to domestic violence torts. Similarly, public policy supports making
coverage as broad as possible and thus attaching the coverage to
automobile policies.220
be much greater than average for a given accident, or both, are more likely to buy insurance.
Their behavior will tend to drive up the price of insurance . . . .
Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1851.
215. It is also possible that adverse selection would not be a problem. See supra Part III.A.4.a.
216. See Wortham, supra note 70, at 888 (noting that since automobile insurance is mandatory,
adverse selection concerns are lessened).
217. Fairness in risk distribution is a purpose of insurance law. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at
18. This Article argues for broader risk distribution, not for a particular redistribution of risk between
specific groups.
218. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 23–29.
219. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 2; DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 2; sources cited in
supra note 33; text accompanying notes 137–42.
220. Attaching the coverage to automobile policies ensures broader risk spreading than limiting it
to homeowners policies. This would not run afoul of the “insurable interest” doctrine of insurance. The
insurable interest doctrine “requires that there be some significant relationship between the insured and
the person, the object, or the activity that is the subject of an insurance transaction.” KEETON
& WIDISS, supra note 21, § 3.1(b). This doctrine is related to moral hazard, discussed infra at Part
III.A.5.a. The basic idea is that people should not receive a net gain from insurance, but should only be
indemnified for losses. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 3.1(b). It is most relevant in contexts
of property and life insurance. See id. §§ 3.3–3.5, at 149–91. The rationale, which is a public policy
against incentives to destroy property or do other bad acts, arguably does not apply to liability
insurance. David M. Smith, Sudden Exposure: Accessing Historic Insurance Policies for the
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The history of the invention of uninsured motorist coverage is
instructive when thinking about the failures of insurance and tort
mechanisms to deal with domestic violence torts and efforts to improve
these mechanisms. The problem of uninsured motorists who could not pay
damage claims became particularly serious in the late 1930s.221 The costs
of accidents caused by uninsured motorists rose to unacceptable levels by
the early 1950s.222 Social, economic and political pressures developed for
legislation aimed at compensating those injured.223 In response, the
insurance industry developed a plan for uninsured motorist coverage224
and changes in risk distribution were thus made. This process has taken
place in other contexts;225 it should now happen in connection with
domestic violence torts.
5. Objections and Responses
a. Moral Hazard
Critics may argue that insuring domestic violence torts would create
an unacceptable “moral hazard.” Moral hazard, which applies to all types
of insurance, is the broad idea that if people are insured against a particular
harm, they will be less likely to avoid that harm, may even suffer it
purposely, and may exaggerate their losses once they suffer it.226
Environmental Liabilities Associated With Newly Acquired Properties or Operations, 25 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 439, 452 (1998). Automobile liability policies currently are limited to liabilities related in some
way to the operation of a vehicle. By contrast, homeowners policies have no such limit. Standard
homeowners policies indemnify homeowners for any liabilities not covered by an exclusion, even if the
liability is not connected with homeownership and even if it greatly exceeds the value of the owner’s
equity in the home. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, at 1133, 1142, App. 1. There is no
theoretical reason why automobile liability policies could not extend to domestic violence torts.
221. See ALAN I. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, § 1.4, at 4 (1969).
222. See id. § 1.6, at 10. The costs in New York state alone were over seven million dollars a
year. Id.
223. See id. Proposals were developed aimed at compensating people regardless of fault. See id.
224. See id. § 1.8, at 12.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 157–63, 221–25.
226. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1848–50. Tom Baker defines moral hazard has
having two components, “situational” moral hazard and “individual” moral hazard. See Baker, supra
note 10, at 120–21. Situational moral hazard is “the effect on incentives whenever one person bears the
costs of harm caused by another. In such a situation, the person causing the harm has less incentive to
avoid that harm than if (all other things being equal) she bore the full costs of that harm herself.” Id. at
120 n.65. Individual moral hazard is more difficult to define but it is understood by underwriters to be
“part of the character of the individuals . . . that participate in insurance arrangements.” Id. at 116. An
individual’s moral hazard, to insurance underwriters, has to do (among other things) with the
individual’s propensity to take care to avoid harm to herself, her possessions, and other people and their
possessions, and an individual’s “degree of attachment to other conventional social norms.” Id. at 117.
See also ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 14–18 (defining moral hazard more narrowly, as a transaction
cost having to do with incomplete information possessed by the insurer about the insured and as being
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Tort liability is thought to impose efficient deterrence incentives on
potential defendants, since they will have to pay liability judgments out of
their own pockets.227 Liability insurance is thought to skew these
incentives, resulting in more harm than would have occurred in the absence
of insurance, since insured defendants will not have to pay judgments out
of their own pockets.228 Insurance companies use various devices to
control moral hazard, such as deductibles, coinsurance provisions,
experience ratings, and risk classification, and take it into account when
they set premiums.229 Other devices to control moral hazard that are
particularly relevant to domestic violence torts are “intentional act
exclusions”230 and “family member exclusions” from homeowners policies.
The reason for the “intentional act exclusion” is the concern that, “If
the insured is able to shift the cost of his willful misconduct from himself
to his insurer, the insured might be less inclined to avoid engaging in such
undesirable conduct.231 Indeed, “The goal of deterring the insured, and
those similarly situated, from engaging in willful misconduct is
accomplished by taking away the one source of payment to which the
victim can confidently look for payment of her claim.”232
the “tendency of an insured to underallocate to loss prevention after purchasing insurance”). See
generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996) (reviewing
historical development of moral hazard). Moral hazard is a concern for all insurance. One is likely to
be less careful to avoid theft of a car sound system, for example, if it is insured than if it is uninsured.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 124, at 50.
227. See supra Part.II.D.1. As Abraham writes in the context of accidents, “[t]he old world in
which those who caused accidents paid their victims out of their own pockets was a comparatively
simple one. In that world, the deterrent effect of tort liability seemed straightforward. In theory at
least, a potential defendant could calculate the cost of liability, discounted by the probability of its
imposition, and thereby determine whether the benefit to be derived from a hazardous activity was
worth seeking. Private law thus could realistically strive to promote optimal levels of safety and risk.”
ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 45. A similar analysis would apply to intentional torts. See supra notes
123–28 and accompanying text.
228. For example, regarding insurance for punitive damages, George Priest claims that “the
number of intentional harm-causing actions and the extent of harm intentionally caused would be higher
if insurance coverage were available than if insurance coverage were excluded.” Priest, supra note 69,
at 1026.
229. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 15. See also Schwartz, supra note 123 (arguing that while
deterrence shifts incentives, the extent of the shift depends on the particular type of insurance and
factors such as experience rating and deductibles).
230. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 15. See also Baker, supra note 10, at 120. As noted above,
intentional acts exclusions are one important reason why there is so little litigation of domestic violence
torts. See supra Part II.C.1. Family member exclusions are discussed further at infra text
accompanying notes 238–39.
231. Fischer, supra note 69, at 111.
232. Id. at 96–97.
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The exclusion assumes that intentional tortfeasors, including domestic
violence tortfeasors, will pay for their torts directly if there is no insurance,
and thus, their torts will be best deterred in the absence of insurance.
This moral hazard objection to insuring the intentional acts that
constitute domestic violence torts, however, is not convincing. The
assumption that the current tort arrangements provide ideal deterrence
incentives, is unwarranted.233 Underenforcement is so great that tort
deterrence is minimal to nonexistent.234 For a range of reasons, individual
defendants who commit domestic violence torts generally do not have to
pay for that harm directly.235 The assumption that leaving such harms
uninsured provides deterrence of such harms is unfounded.
Instituting a system whereby harm would be insured, but insurance
companies would seek reimbursement from insureds, would be likely to
create more deterrence, since more tortfeasors would have to pay for their
torts.236 Moreover, unlike today, claims would be brought for domestic
violence torts and the costs of domestic violence torts would be more likely
to be borne by the perpetrator. Indeed, properly structured insurance is
unlikely to decrease deterrence and is in fact likely to increase deterrence
through reimbursement and pricing.
The widespread availability of employer liability insurance for
employees’ intentional torts and sexual harassment underscores the
weakness of the moral hazard rationale for refusing to insure individuals’
domestic violence torts.237 Critics might argue that the moral hazard
concerns are different and reduced for employers as compared to
individuals: because employers are not directly committing intentional torts
and sexual harassment, but are merely being insured for liability, the moral
hazard created by the insurance is much less than when individuals are
insured for their own intentional torts. This argument is weak, however,
since the moral hazard issues for the insured employer in the employment
setting would be significant. Employers can exercise a great deal of control
over the employment setting. If a firm is insured for employees’
233. See supra Part II.D.1.
234. See id. Not only are individual defendants unlikely to pay for intentional harm directly if
there is no insurance, but in the case of harm from domestic violence, specific barriers obstruct
enforcement and compensation. For a discussion of short statutes of limitations for intentional torts, see
supra Parts II.C.3, IV.B.1; for procedural barriers, see supra Part II.C.4; and for other factors, see
supra Part II.C.5.
235. See supra Parts II.C.2–4.
236. See supra Part II.D.1.
237. See Klenk, supra note 15, at 330 (noting the availability of third-party insurance covering an
employee’s sexual harassment).
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intentional torts and sexual harassment, it might rationally choose to forego
adequate screening, training or supervision of employees which would
prevent some of the torts and harassment. Because of the insurance, more
intentional torts and sexual harassment would occur. This coverage
nonetheless exists, presumably because the social, economic and political
justifications for its existence outweigh the moral hazard issues. Similarly,
social, economic and political reasons for domestic violence tort coverage
outweigh the moral hazard issues.
The “family member exclusion” is included in policies because of
moral hazard concerns that family members are particularly likely to
engage in fraud and collusion.238 The widely held assumption that family
members are more likely to defraud insurers than others is not universally
shared.239 With no family member exclusion, as the plan proposes,
inevitably there will be some fraud and collusion. The possibility of some
fraud and collusion, however, must be considered against the backdrop of
the current system which excludes all claims, even valid ones, from
coverage.
To the extent that moral hazard is a concern, there are ways to combat
it short of refusing to insure liability for domestic violence torts altogether.
Policies can contain deductibles or coinsurance provisions, which are
238. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 4.9(c)(1) (noting that family member automobile
exclusions were “designed with a view to protecting insurers from collusive suits.”). See, e.g., Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Feshali, 814 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1991) (acknowledging legislative change which overturned
Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984)); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712
P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) (ruling that despite possibility of household collusion, policy of protecting
victims of automobile accidents outweighs importance of protecting insurers from possible collusion);
Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984) (recognizing possibility of fraud
and collusion between family members but holding that public policy in favor of insurance and
compensation for those injured in automobile accidents rendered family member exclusion invalid).
See also Shannon v. Shannon, 442 N.W.2d 25 (Wis. 1989) (upholding family member exclusion in
homeowners policy in view of likely bias of family members). See generally Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225 (1995) (noting that while intrafamily immunity
was the law of torts, family member exclusions were consistent with the law of torts, but that when
immunity was abolished, policy exclusion contradicted tort policy). See also Martin J. McMahon,
Annotation, Validity, Under Insurance Statutes, of Coverage Exclusion for Injury or Death of Insured’s
Family or Household Members, 52 A.L.R. 4th 18 (1987) (noting that “[p]rovisions excluding from
coverage members of an insured’s family or household have been held valid and effective to protect the
insurer against collusive claims”).
239. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985) (announcing that “we
refuse to indulge in the assumption that close relatives will prevaricate so as to promote a spurious
lawsuit”); Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 393 (Ohio 1985) (arguing that spouses are no more
likely to defraud auto insurance companies than are unrelated parties in car accident situations who
want to provide compensation to an injured passenger). See generally Tobias, supra note 36.
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common ways of reducing moral hazard.240 Reimbursement provisions can
play an important role.241 Reimbursement by the insured should undermine
moral hazard, since the tortfeasor’s assets will be available to reimburse the
insurance company.242 The litigation process contains mechanisms
designed to root out problems of fraud and collusion.243 More claims will
be brought than if there were no insurance, and more tortfeasors will pay
through reimbursement than they currently pay in the insuranceless world
of domestic violence torts. Thus, there should be more deterrence.
b. Public Policy
Critics may argue that insuring domestic violence torts is contrary to
public policy. A common justification for the refusal to insure intentional
torts, more broadly, is public policy.244 It is well-established that “an
insurer may not contract to indemnify an insured against the civil
consequences of . . . willful criminal conduct.”245 Deterrence is often cited
as one of the specific public policy reasons for the intentional act
exclusion.246 According to an influential case of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, “[w]ere a person able to insure himself against the economic
consequences of his intentional wrongdoing, the deterrence attributable to
financial responsibility would be missing.”247 As discussed above,
however, liability and financial responsibility that exist only in theory do
not create tort deterrence.248 Thus, deterrence is an invalid justification for
the intentional acts exclusion.
Another set of public policy arguments stem from the idea that
wrongdoers should not benefit from intentional misconduct, and that,
therefore, insurance against such conduct should be prohibited.249 Despite
the broad public policy against insuring intentional acts, however, many
240. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 124, at 51.
241. See, e.g., Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, A.2d 603, 606 (N.J. 1978) (noting that insurance
company may seek subrogation from insured for payment it makes for intentional tort claims).
242. This would also be the case for the uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor policy.
243. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1901–06.
244. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 21, § 5.4(d)(1). The public policy exception can be
implied by courts in the absence of an express policy provision. See id.
245. Id. (quoting Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (N.J. 1978)). The public
policy exclusion that courts might imply could even be broader than the intentional acts exclusion. See
id.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 237–43. The public policy justification overlaps with the
moral hazard justification. See supra Part III.A.5.a.
247. Ambassador, 388 A.2d at 606.
248. See supra Part II.D.1.
249. See Fischer, supra note 69, at 111 (noting California Insurance Statute’s justification of
“prohibiting indemnification for intentional misconduct”).
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courts have upheld provisions that do.250 Moreover, if insurance is
provided for financial consequences of intentional wrongdoing, it can
include a right of reimbursement so that the insurance company can seek to
recover whatever it pays from the insured, and thus the insured will not
benefit from his misconduct.251 The New Jersey Supreme Court articulated
the “general principle that an insurer may not contract to indemnify an
insured against the civil consequences of his own wilful criminal act,”
where an insured arsonist’s actions had killed four people.252 The court
further stated:
[W]hen the insurance company has contracted to pay an innocent person
monetary damages due to any liability of the insured, such payment
when ascribable to a criminal event should be made so long as the
benefit thereof does not enure to the [insured]. In furtherance of that
justifiable end, under most circumstances it is equitable and just that the
insurer be indemnified by the insured for the payment to the injured
party. In subrogating the insurer to the injured person’s rights so that the
insurer may be reimbursed for its payment of the insured’s debt to the
injured person, the public policy principle to which we adhere, that the
assured may not be relieved of financial responsibility arising out of his
criminal act, is honored.253

According to this reasoning, public policy is not violated when the victim
of the intentional wrongdoing may benefit, but not the wrongdoer, since the
insurance company may seek reimbursement from the wrongdoer.
250. See, e.g., Andover Newton Theological Sch. Inc. v. Cont. Cas. Co., 930 F.2d 89, 95–96 (1st
Cir. 1991); Sch. Dist. of Royal Oak v. Cont. Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1990); New Madrid
County Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. 1, Enlarge v. Cont. Cas. Co. 904 F.2d 1236, 1242–43 (8th Cir.
1990) (public policy of Missouri allows insurance coverage for insured’s intentional acts when the
policy provides for such coverage); Solo Cup Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1197–98 (7th Cir.
1980); Union Camp Corp. v. Cont. Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Ga. 1978); Titan Indem. Co. v.
Riley, 679 So. 2d 701 (Ala. 1996) (holding Alabama public policy does not forbid enforcement of
policy requiring insurer to pay damages for officers’ acts of malicious prosecution, assault and battery);
Everglades Marina, Inc. v. Am. E. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1979) (ruling Florida public policy
allowed enforcement of insurance contract requiring insurer to compensate owners for damage to boats
in marina, which insured had intentionally burned); Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 612 N.E.2d
846, 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), aff’d on other grounds, 641 N.E.2d 395 (Ill. 1994); Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Minn. 1994); Am. Home
Assurance Co. v. Fish, 451 A.2d 358, 360 (N.H. 1982) (holding New Hampshire public policy does not
forbid insuring for liability arising directly against that insured from intentional torts such as slander
and false arrest). See generally Sean W. Gallagher, Note: The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance
for Intentional Employment Discrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1256 (1994) (discussing courts’
treatment of employer liability insurance provisions that by their language seem to cover both
unintentional and untentional tort liability).
251. See id. at 111–14.
252. Ambassador, 388 A.2d at 606. The court went on to list various exceptions to the principle.
Id.
253. Id.
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An additional public policy justification for an intentional acts
exclusion may be a corrective justice notion that wrongdoers should pay
directly for their wrongs.254 Liability insurance arguably undermines this
justification because the wrongdoer does not pay directly.255 Leaving a
victim of a wrongdoer uncompensated, however, is not consistent with
corrective justice aims either.256 Thus, the potential corrective justice
justification for the public policy exception is weak.257
The public policy of deterrence that is supposedly furthered by the
intentional acts exclusion must be considered in light of the public policy
effects of refusing to insure domestic violence torts. The refusal to insure
means that claims are not brought, tortfeasors do not bear the costs of their
torts, and the negative consequences rebound throughout society.258
“Public policy” is not a compelling objection to the plan.
c. Interference with Free Choice and the Market
Arguments may be made that the current situation of uninsured
domestic violence torts simply reflects consumer demand and that
consumer demand should not be tampered with.259 As noted above,260
however, the current insurance market does not necessarily reflect
consumer demand. Moreover, such an argument reflects a simplistic
conception of individuals which has been challenged by scholarship
incorporating behavioral psychology into law and economics.261
The lack of enforcement of tort liability rules and the lack of insurance
for domestic violence torts can be seen as market failures, which call for
new and different regulation. This proposal’s intervention in the market is
254. Under the corrective justice view of tort law, tort law deals with situations where one person
wrongfully injuries another, and aims to nullify losses and gains that arise from such situations. See
David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry II, Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 868–70 (2001). See also Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law As Corrective
Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2350, 2355 (1990).
As Ellen Pryor describes this idea, “the combination of an injured victim, along with a wrongdoer that
is in some way morally responsible for the injury, gives rise on the victim’s part to a claim for
compensation or restoration by the wrongdoer.” Pryor, supra note 10, at 1747.
255. See id. at 1748 (noting that when an insured receives insurance coverage for intentionally
caused harms, the insured usually does not pay for this coverage through premiums, and thus is excused
from paying, which may be inconsistent with corrective justice.) See generally Schwartz, The Ethics
and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313 (1990).
256. See Pryor, supra note 10, at 1748.
257. See generally Schwartz, supra note 255.
258. See supra Part II.D.
259. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 13, at 1547 (arguing that insurance markets reflect consumer
demand and tort law does not).
260. See part III.A.5.
261. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 123, at 1490.
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likely to have unanticipated effects, as market intervention generally
does.262 Intervention in the insurance market, however, has been justified
in the past for a variety of compelling reasons.263 It is no less justified
now.
d. Transaction Costs
Another objection to the plan may be that it would involve such large
transaction costs that it would reduce welfare and resources overall.264 The
resources involved in moving costs from the victims of domestic violence
torts, to insurance companies, and in turn to the perpetrators, will be high.
Insurers’ work in classifying risks will be costly, and distributing risks in a
way other than the status quo will have costs.265
It is difficult to predict whether these costs would reduce overall
welfare and resources; many different outcomes are possible. The goal of
liability for domestic violence torts is not an efficient level of accidents, as
in other tort contexts, but an end to domestic violence torts. Moreover part
262. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 95–100. One unfortunate effect might be less reporting of
domestic violence injuries. This might happen if rates for the “uninsured domestic violence tort policy”
were based on an insured’s past experience of domestic violence. If a potential insured knew this, she
might be less likely to seek medical attention for, or to report domestic violence, in order to keep her
rates down, since presumably the insurance company could find this information out through the
underwriting process by asking her questions on the application and making her sign releases.
Similarly, if rates for the liability portion of the policy were based on whether an insured had committed
domestic violence, and a potential insured knew this, a person who committed a domestic violence tort
would be more likely to pressure a victim to not report or seek medical attention for her injuries. A
more fortunate effect would be that a potential liability defendant, knowing his rates would go up if he
were found to have committed domestic violence, would refrain from doing so. Other effects might
include insurance companies taking steps to reduce the incidence of domestic violence, see Tom Baker,
Insurance and the Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES (2002) (describing insurance as a form of private and (delegated) public regulation), and
victims of domestic violence torts no longer being pressured to underlitigate, or characterize
defendants’ actions as negligent rather than intentional. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 341; Pryor, supra
note 10, at 1722–23 (describing “underlitigating” of domestic violence claims).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 157–65.
264. “Transaction costs” are broadly defined as “the costs of exchange.” COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 124, at 87–88. Although often defined in terms of the costs of voluntary exchange, see id, the term
also is applied to the costs of an exchange that is accomplished through litigation. See, e.g., Deborah R.
Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for Damage
Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137 n.1 (2001) (noting that litigation feeshifting schemes would involve transaction costs and citing study of asbestos litigation finding that
transaction costs constituted 60% of the total amount paid by defendants); Robin Jones, Searching for
Solutions to the Problems Caused by the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Litigation, 14 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 549, 553 (2001) (discussing transaction costs of asbestos litigation). To say that the costs of the
plan are such that it would reduce welfare and resources is another way of saying that the plan is
inefficient. See supra note 129.
265. See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 98–99.
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of the goal is greater fairness, and this may conflict with “pure” efficiency
concerns.266 This conflict is present in other contexts and should be
resolved in favor of fairness for those injured by domestic violence torts.267
6. Conclusion
Starting from the insight that tort law cannot be understood in
isolation from insurance, this Section has explained insurance-based
reasons why underenforcement of domestic violence tort prohibitions is so
extreme.268 On close inspection, supposedly vital reasons why intentional
acts such as domestic violence torts cannot be insured are revealed as
weak.269 Considering a range of insurance contexts, such as employer
practices liability insurance270 and uninsured motorist coverage,271 the
insuranceless world of domestic violence torts emerges as less of an
economic or social necessity and more of a policy choice. Strong reasons
exist for the choice of a different policy, namely the “Domestic Violence
Torts Insurance Plan” outlined here.
B. TORT LAW REFORMS
This Section analyzes the statute of limitations and procedural barriers
that contribute to underenforcement of domestic violence tort prohibitions.
1. Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations for intentional torts generally are shorter than
for other torts.272 This is one reason why there have been so few tort suits
for domestic violence injuries.273 This Subsection explores the historical
266. See id.
267. If high transaction costs or objections are compelling, an alternative is to greatly expand
existing victims compensation funds and adapt them more fully to the needs of domestic violence
victims. There are victims compensation funds in every state. See Greer, supra note 135, at 334. In
order for a crime victim to receive compensation funds, a perpetrator does not have to be convicted but
the victim must cooperate with the authorities. See id. at 366–68. Currently, only a small proportion of
victims compensation funds go to domestic violence victims. See id. at 348. Funds could seek
reimbursement from perpetrators, which might retain deterrence incentives, but this has not been very
successful in the past. See id. at 382. Special compensation funds have been developed for toxic tort
exposure compensation, see ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 44–63, and more consideration should be
given to such a possibility for victims of domestic violence torts.
268. See supra Parts III.A.1–4.
269. See supra Part III.A.5.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 237–43.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 220–25.
272. See supra Part II.C.3.
273. See id.
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background of torts statutes of limitations. It reviews possible reasons for
the disparity between the relatively short statutes of limitations for assault,
battery, and false imprisonment on the one hand, and the often longer
statutes of limitations for negligence, strict liability, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, on the other hand.274
Historical analysis reveals that the disparity originated in an Act of
Parliament passed in 1623 which provided that assault and related torts had
a statute of limitations of four years, while trespass on the case (from which
negligence is commonly thought to be derived) had a statute of limitations
of six years.275 Little systematic analysis of the disparities has been
undertaken since 1623, at least in the United States.276 The disparities
operate in a manner that tends to prevent suits for torts that arise out of
domestic violence. There is no good reason for the disparities. The
relatively short statutes of limitations for the types of torts that tend to
apply to domestic violence injuries should be extended to be at least
commensurate with the statutes of limitations for other torts such as
negligence and strict liability. Even better, legislatures should pass statutes
of limitations tailored to the issues and dynamics of domestic violence.
a. Historical Background: Lines Drawn in 1623
Before 1623, there were no statutes of limitations for tort claims.277 In
1623, the English Parliament passed a statute of limitations which divided
personal actions into three groups with three different time periods: two,
four, and six years.278 A two-year statute of limitations applied to
274. See infra text accompanying notes 275–320.
275. See WILLIAM D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS SAVING STATUTES 8 (1978).
276. Relatively little academic attention has been paid to the policies underlying statutes of
limitations, compared to their ubiquity. See, e.g., id. at 9; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897) (noting that statutes of limitations “never have been explained or
theorized about in any adequate way”); Harry B. Littell, A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitation, 21
IND. L.J. 23, 23 (1945) (noting that statutes of limitations have been supported by courts both in the
U.S. and England since the Limitation Act of 1623); John R. Mix, State Statutes of Limitation:
Contrasted and Compared, 3 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 106, 106 (1931) (pointing out that statutes of
limitations have not developed along practical or logical lines); Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich,
The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 454 (1997) (noting the relative
dearth of attention to purposes behind statutes of limitations); Developments in the Law: Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1177 (1950).
277. See FERGUSON, supra note 275, at 9; Mix, supra note 276, at 107; Developments in the Law:
Statutes of Limitations, supra note 276, at 1178.
278. See FERGUSON, supra note 275, at 13; An Act for Limitation of Actions, and for Avoiding of
Suits in Law, 21 Jam. 1, c. 16 (1623) (Eng.), reprinted in FERGUSON, supra note 275, app. D, at 515
[hereinafter An Act for Limitation of Actions].
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slander.279 A four-year period applied to “Actions of . . . Assault, Battery,
Wounding, Imprisonment, or any of them . . . .”280 A six-year period
applied to “[t]respass Quare clausum fregit,” trespass, actions upon the
case (other than for slander), actions for account, debt, detinue, and
replevin for goods and chattels.281 These time periods were tolled for
persons “under disability”282 such as minors, married women, and persons
in jail or at sea.283 After the disability for such persons was removed, they
had ten years to pursue their cause of action.284
b. Current State Laws
Most states derived their statutes of limitations from the 1623 Act.285
Current state statutes of limitations generally lump assault, battery and false
imprisonment together in a short time period,286 and also typically fix a
time period for “all other actions,”287 known as a “residual” statute of
limitations.288 These “residual” statutes of limitations typically are longer
than the statutes of limitations for assault, battery, and false
imprisonment.289 The longer “residual” statute of limitations generally is
applied to negligence,290 and runs for six years.291 In the 1623 statute, the
time period for bringing “actions upon the case” is six years.292 The
“action upon the case” was the predecessor of negligence liability.293 Thus,
the relatively long statute of limitations for negligence currently in effect in
most states derives from the 1623 Act, which set a relatively long statute of
limitations for actions on the case and for certain other actions. Similarly,
the relatively short statute of limitations for assault and various other
intentional torts derives from the 1623 Act. More recent additions to the
279. See FERGUSON, supra note 275, at 13; An Act for Limitation of Actions, supra note 278,
¶ III, at 517.
280. An Act for Limitation of Actions, supra note 278, ¶ III, at 517.
281. See id. at 516.
282. See FERGUSON, supra note 275, at 13.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 46; Mix, supra note 276, at 108.
286. See Carrillo, supra note 64. Miscellaneous statutes of limitations pertain to specific subjects
such as construction injuries and products liability. See id.
287. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 276, at 1179.
288. See, e.g., Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 245–47 (1989).
289. See supra note 87. See Owens, 488 U.S. at 245–48 (noting that states have various statutes
of limitations for intentional torts but that each state has a “general or residual” statute of limitations).
These range from one to ten years. See also Carrillo, supra note 64.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See An Act for Limitation of Actions, supra note 278, ¶ III, at 516.
293. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 38, § 6, at 30–31.
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torts roster, such as products liability and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, also generally fall within the “residual” statute of limitations that
derives from the original trespass on the case statute of limitations.294 As
in the 1623 statute, current state laws usually contain provisions that
postpone or extend the relevant time period in specific circumstances.295
c. Rationales
The historical record is not clear as to why the 1623 Act was
passed.296 William Ferguson makes an argument based on the structure of
the statutes of limitations to conclude that “it logically appears that the
primary purpose of the statutes was to protect defendant against loss of
witnesses and evidence and to protect his acts in reasonable reliance upon
plaintiff’s inaction.”297 Tolling provisions that delay accrual of the statute
of limitations until the plaintiff is no longer under a disability apply where
competing interests outweigh protecting the defendant.298 This general
explanation, however, does not shed light on why the specific decisions
were made as to the appropriate length of statute of limitations for different
kinds of suits. 299
Systematic analysis of the operation of statutes of limitations is
virtually nonexistent in the United States, presumably because under
federalism, each state chooses its own statutes of limitations and the issues
are not analyzed at a national level.300 By contrast, in England and Wales
in the twentieth century, numerous official bodies have reviewed statutes of
294. See supra note 87.
295. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 276, at 1179.
296. See FERGUSON, supra note 275, at 40–41.
297. Id. at 43. Another source draws an inference from other laws passed contemporaneously that
the Act was intended to “keep out of the King’s courts what might be considered inconsequential
claims, and, incidentally, to minimize the hardship which suit in the King’s courts imposed on poor
defendants.” Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 276, at 1178.
298. Tolling provisions represent “instances where competing interests outweigh the interest of
the defendant. The few instances where the plaintiff could not sue because of a disability existing when
the cause of action accrued exemplify this principle. Since the plaintiff could not protect himself, it
would be unfair to punish him by applying the statute.” FERGUSON, supra note 275, at 44.
299. If the purpose was to protect the defendant against loss of witnesses and evidence, why set a
period of six years, rather than one year, for trespass actions? If such was the purpose, why have
different lengths of time for different actions? Why have four years to bring an assault action but six
for replevin actions for goods? It seems that witnesses and evidence in both types of cases would be
affected by the passage of time. But see Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 276, at 471–82 (noting that
some evidence becomes clearer over time).
300. See infra notes 303–19.
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limitations and reported to Parliament.301 Interestingly, the disparity
between the statute of limitations for intentional torts and for negligence
suits now cuts the opposite way in England and Wales, which have a threeyear statute of limitations for negligence and a six-year statute of
limitations for intentional torts.302
The United States Supreme Court wrote in 1989, in the context of
deciding which state statute of limitations should apply to claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that “[p]redictability . . . [is] a primary goal of
statutes of limitations.”303 The principle of predictability, however, does
not reveal how long a statute of limitations needs to be, only that there
needs to be a statute of limitations. Two scholars have shown that the
simple-minded invocation of various policies in support of statutes of
limitations often does not reflect the complexity of actual situations.304
The reasons for the current overall disparity between statutes of
limitations for many intentional torts, on the one hand, and negligence, on
the other hand, remain unclear. In one of the few articles that compares
different states’ statutes of limitations, John Mix in 1931 noted that the sixyear limit of many statutes of limitations for many causes of action has
historical reasons, “[b]ut there seems to be no logical or practical basis for
the other differences in time limits.”305 The derivation of contemporary
statutes of limitations from the 1623 Act seems to be the most reasonable
301. See, e.g., In re Stubbings v. United Kingdom, No. 36-37/1995/542-543/628-629, ¶ ¶ 28–35
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996), at http://www.echr.coe.int/hudoc (recounting history of statute of limitations
commissions).
302. See id. ¶ ¶ 35–36. In Stubbings, the European Court of Human Rights rejected a challenge to
the six-year statute of limitations for intentional torts brought by adult victims of child sexual abuse,
who filed suit more than six years after their eighteenth birthday (the statute of limitations having been
tolled until their eighteenth birthday by operation of law). Plaintiffs argued inter alia that they did not
realize that the childhood sexual abuse may have caused their mental problems until more than six years
after they turned eighteen, and that the court’s refusal to let them sue denied them rights of access to
court and to be free from discrimination. The statute of limitations for negligence was extendable in
appropriate circumstances but not for other torts. See id. ¶ 36. Recognizing that the statue of
limitations for child sexual abuse might need to change in view of recent knowledge about sexual
abuse, id. ¶ 56, the Court nonetheless held that the existing statute of limitations, which barred their
claims, was acceptable, id. ¶ ¶ 8–29, 43, 57, 72, 75.
303. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989).
304. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 276, at 471–82. For example, while statutes of limitations
often are justified as reflecting a policy to minimize deterioration of evidence, in some situations
evidence actually becomes clearer, as opposed to less clear, with time. See id. They note that shorter
statutes of limitations are sometimes passed for political reasons, such as the reduction of wrongful
death claims from two years to one year in 1905, which they believe was a response to increased
industrialization. See id. at 499.
305. Mix, supra note 276, at 117. Mix argued that a uniform law of statutes of limitations should
be adopted. See id.
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explanation for the overall disparity between intentional torts and other
claims.306
One might speculate that a shorter statute of limitations means that a
particular cause of action is disfavored, but analysis shows otherwise. As
the Harvard Law Review editors noted in 1950, “[m]any special statutes
provide for relatively short periods of a year or less, apparently indicating
disfavor of the action or a policy in favor of particularly quick settlement.
Suits for slander . . . are frequently subject to short statutes.”307 The 1623
Act provided a two-year statute of limitations for slander.308 It does not
make sense, however, to say that suits for all intentional torts are simply
“disfavored,” when it is these kinds of torts, not negligence, for which
punitive damages can be awarded,309 when it is widely recognized that the
acts for which recovery is sought are more reprehensible than, for example,
negligent acts,310 and when some of these same torts are nondischargeable
in bankruptcy because of their seriousness.311 Similarly, the idea that the
major purpose of statutes of limitations is “undoubtedly one of fairness to
the defendant”312 is unpersuasive. If fairness to the defendant is the
primary consideration, so that the defendant after a certain time can “rest
easy,” there is no reason why statutes of limitations for intentional torts
should be shorter than for negligence. Many statutes of limitations,
counterintuitively, let the more egregious wrongdoer rest easy well before
the negligent wrongdoer can.
Perhaps there are specific policy reasons for having shorter statutes of
limitations for assault, battery, and false imprisonment than for negligence
and other torts.313 One possibility is that it is easier to identify the
306. See supra text accompanying notes 285–99.
307. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitation, supra note 276, at 1180.
308. See FERGUSON, supra note 275, at 13; An Act for Limitation of Actions, supra note 278,
¶ III, at 517.
309. See DOBBS, supra note 38, § 381 (noting that punitive damages are awarded in a variety of
circumstances for egregious acts including battery and that “[s]ome courts insist upon malice, ill-will,
and intent to injure, evil motive or the like, while others have found it sufficient that the defendant
engages in wanton misconduct with conscious indifference to risk”).
310. See sources cited supra note 28.
311. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2001) (barring debts for fraud committed while debtor was acting
in a fiduciary capacity); § 523(a)(6) (prohibiting debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity for to the property of another entity); § 523(a)(9) (preventing discharge for death or
personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful
because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug or another substance).
312. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 276, at 1185.
313. The deep historical basis of the disparity is not in itself a justification for its continuation. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously stated, “[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” Holmes, supra note 276, at 469.
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defendant in an assault or battery case than in other kinds of cases, so the
burden should be on the plaintiff to bring the case sooner.314 But this is not
always the case, for as in the case of an unconsented to action in surgery, it
may be difficult to identify the defendant.315 But even if it is easier for the
plaintiff to identify an intentional tort defendant than other defendants, this
is not a compelling reason for the statute of limitations to be shorter for
such claims. Since intentional torts are more reprehensible316 than other
torts, the policy reasons would cut the other way. Deterrence is especially
important for intentional torts, in view of their seriousness; moreover, for
deterrence to work, claims must be brought.317 A short statute of
limitations prevents meritorious claims from being brought, undercutting
deterrence incentives.
d. Conclusion
The disparity between assault, battery, and false imprisonment on the
one hand, and negligence and other torts, on the other hand, goes back
almost four centuries. When the 1623 Act was passed, coverture was in
full force, thus a wife suing a husband for battery was inconceivable.318
Parliament could not have been considering the circumstances of persons
injured by domestic violence torts when it determined the categories to
which each time period would apply. Now that interspousal tort immunity
has been abrogated, other barriers to spouses seeking tort relief for injuries
inflicted during a marriage have come to light. These include the practical
impossibility of suing a spouse for domestic violence torts while the
marriage is still in effect.319 Safety, economics, and psychology also are
barriers to filing such lawsuits, either while a relationship is ongoing or in
its immediate aftermath.320 These short statutes of limitations are not
designed for domestic violence torts, but for situations where the types of
barriers mentioned above are not present.
The disparity between short statutes of limitations for assault, battery
and false imprisonment, and other torts, operates particularly to bar claims
for domestic violence torts. This, in itself, is a compelling reason to
314. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 829 (2d ed.
1999).
315. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (holding that when plaintiff receives
injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment but is unable to identify the person
causing the injury, everyone who might have caused the injury must explain conduct).
316. See sources cited supra note 28.
317. See supra Part II.D.1.
318. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 101; Tobias, supra note 36, at 359.
319. See supra Part II.C.3.
320. See supra Parts II.C.3, II.C.5.
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eliminate it by extending the statute of limitations for these torts to be at
least commensurate with the statute of limitations for negligence.
Moreover, states that have short statutes of limitations for all torts should
consider lengthening them in view of the considerations outlined here.
Indeed, given the dynamics of domestic violence,321 it makes sense to have
a statute of limitations designed for domestic violence torts. California has
adopted a useful approach. The California statute provides that a domestic
violence tort case must be filed within three years of the later of two
events:322 the date of the last act of domestic violence,323 or within three
years of the date the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that the
plaintiff’s injury or illness resulted from defendant’s act of domestic
violence.324 This approach combines a relatively short statute of
limitations, three years, with sensible points at which the clock should start
running. Alternatively, Michigan provides a longer period for domestic
violence claims than for other intentional tort claims: five years for assault
and battery claims brought by former intimate partners, and two years for
assault and battery by others.325 Although the merits of each may be
debated,326 both are superior to the current situation; California’s may be
the most appropriate given the realities of domestic violence.
2. Procedural Reforms
Some courts have required that tort claims be filed with divorces.327
There are many reasons this should be rejected. It forces the victim to
assert tort claims at a time when it may be very perilous, even lifethreatening in some instances, to do so.328 Moreover, there are institutional
reasons why joinder should not be required. Family courts and judges
generally329 are not equipped to deal with tort claims. Juries do not decide
divorce issues but do decide tort claims, so complex joinder issues may
321. See supra Parts II.C.3, II.C.5.
322. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 340.15 (West 2001).
323. See id. § 340.15(a)(1).
324. See id. § 340.15(a)(2).
325. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5805 (2000) (Five-year statute of limitations for assault or battery
brought by person assaulted or battered by former spouse or intimate partner; two years for assault and
battery).
326. See Dalton, supra note 4, at 362–63 (arguing for a tolling provision specific to domestic
violence cases).
327. See supra Part II.C.3.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 90–91.
329. Some family court judges are qualified. See Digges, supra note 62 (recounting Michigan
judge’s efforts to educate family law practitioners on tort claims for domestic violence). See Alexander
v. Alexander (Wayne County Mich. Circuit Ct. July 11, 2000) available at http://www.lawyersweekly
usa.com/opinions.
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arise if tort claims must be asserted at the time of divorce.330 Judges who
hear family cases may not have authority to hear jury cases.331 A
requirement that all potential tort claims be joined with divorces would
likely increase the number of such claims,332 undermining the “no-fault”
policy that currently predominates in our family law system.333 By
contrast, it is likely that if separate tort claims can be brought later, only the
more serious claims will be brought. On the other hand, in some cases
joinder may be appropriate and should be permitted.334
Clare Dalton persuasively concludes, as have the supreme courts of
several states,335 that claimants should not be forced to join their tort claims
with divorce lawsuits:336
The most crucial argument in favor of allowing a woman to wait until
her divorce is resolved before she brings a tort action against her abuser
is that unless the legal system preserves this option, a tort remedy will be
foreclosed altogether for any woman who feels that pursuing a claim is
simply too dangerous, until such time as her separation from her abuser
has been successfully accomplished, and a structure has been put in place
that sets limits to his interactions with her and her children. If she is
forced to pursue the tort claim together with the divorce, or even to
notify the probate court that she is bringing it, or plans to bring it in
another court, she may well forfeit the claim to buy her safety. But if the
legal system encourages or facilitates this choice, it rewards her abuser
by reinforcing his belief that violence, or the threat of violence, is an
effective strategy to secure his interests.337

Concerns that a person might receive a double recovery, first through the
divorce property division or alimony, and second through the tort case, can
be satisfied by ensuring that a tort recovery is reduced by amounts
330. See, e.g., Henricksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1141 (Me. 1993).
331. Almost every state has a separate family or probate court designed to deal with family
matters.
332. See Delahunty v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 1290, 1296 (Conn. 1996).
333. See Henricksen, 622 A.2d at 1141. The idea of “no-fault” often fits uneasily with the reality
of family breakups. This disconnect has been noted by many. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L. J. 2525, 2526–27
(1994); GLENDON, supra note 145, at 104–11.
334. See Fines, supra note 93, at 299; Krohse, supra note 93, at 954–55.
335. See, e.g., Delahunty, 674 A.2d 1290; Henricksen, 622 A.2d 1135.
336. Dalton, supra note 4, at 386–88.
337. Id. at 386–87.
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recovered through the divorce that were awarded because of the tortious
conduct of one of the spouses.338
3. Conclusion
Two straightforward reforms should be considered to begin to address
tort-related reasons for the underenforcement of domestic violence tort
prohibitions. First, statutes of limitations that apply to domestic violence
tort claims must either be extended to the length of the applicable statute or
by developing a statute designed for domestic violence claims. Second,
joinder of tort claims with divorce claims must be permissive rather than
mandatory.
IV. THE ACCIDENT-CENTERED FOCUS OF
TWENTIETH-CENTURY TORT LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Having analyzed and proposed specific responses to the insurance and
tort obstacles to domestic violence tort liability, this Part considers the
implications of the “accident-centered” focus of twentieth-century, U.S.
torts scholarship.339 This focus originated in the latter part of the
nineteenth and early twentieth century,340 when domestic violence torts
were invisible and inconceivable.341
Much twentieth-century torts
scholarship, with its focus on accidentally-caused harm, implicitly assumes
that the intellectual and practical problems of intentionally caused harm
have been addressed and, presumably, solved.342 Despite significant
changes that make domestic violence torts cognizable, they have remained
largely invisible in mainstream legal scholarship.343
B. TWO INFLUENTIAL COMMENTARIES
The focus on accidents and the simultaneous notion that the law and
problems of intentionally caused harm are archaic can be traced back at
338. See id. at 388–94. In states with a comprehensive no-fault policy, tortious conduct of one of
the spouses will not affect divorce allocation of property or alimony anyway. See, e.g., Henricksen, 622
A.2d at 1141.
339. See generally Grey, supra note 124 (examining accident-centered concept of torts and tracing
its origins).
340. See id. See infra Part IV.B.
341. See infra text accompanying notes 352–67.
342. See infra notes 352–72.
343. See infra notes 366–82.
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least to Oliver Wendell Holmes’ influential 1897 essay, The Path of the
Law:344
Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized
wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like . . . But the torts with which our
courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of certain well
known businesses. They are injuries to person or property by railroads,
factories, and the like.345

Holmes’ empirical observation that claims for industrial injuries were
brought frequently in 1897, implies that assault and slander claims were
less frequent. More importantly, he is identifying assault and slander with
the past, and industrial injuries with the future.346
Roscoe Pound made a similar point about the progress beyond
intentional torts:
[I]n civilized society men must be able to assume that others will do
them no intended injury—that others will commit no intentional
aggressions upon them. The savage must move stealthily, avoid the skyline and go armed. The civilized man assumes that no one will attack
him and so moves among his fellow men openly and unarmed, going
about his business in a minute division of labor. Otherwise there could
be no division of labor beyond the differentiation of men of fighting age,
as we see it in a primitive society . . . Everywhere dolus347 is first dealt
with. The system of nominate derelicts or nominate torts, both in Roman
law and in our law, proceeds on this postulate.348

Introducing the idea of negligence, Pound goes on to assert that “in
civilized society men must be able to assume that their fellow men . . . will
[act] with due care” so as not to impose an unreasonable degree of risk
upon them.349 The underlying notion is that the law and problems of
assaults and “intentional aggressions”350 were resolved a long time ago,
and both law and society have moved on to less obvious and more
challenging problems. While Pound’s statement is unusually explicit, this
344. See Holmes, supra note 276. Thomas Grey, in a recent article, traces the focus on accidents
and negligence even further, to an 1873 essay by Holmes entitled The Theory of Torts. Grey, supra note
124, at 1232.
345. Holmes, supra note 276, at 467.
346. This is not to assert that he developed his tort theories in response to the increasing
predominance of negligence claims. Grey argues that Holmes’ motives in placing accidents and
negligence at the center of torts stemmed from his desire to create a coherent theory rather than a
response to the concrete problem of accidental injury. See Grey, supra note 124, at 1257.
347. Dolus is guile, deceitfulness, malicious fraud. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (6th ed.
1990).
348. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 169–70 (1922).
349. Id. at 170.
350. Id. at 169.
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idea appears to be an implicit assumption in much twentieth-century torts
scholarship.351
At the time Holmes and Pound suggested that intentional torts were a
concern of the past, actions by husbands that caused harm to wives were
rarely recognized by the legal system, and domestic violence, as we
recognize it today, was legally nonexistent.352 Interspousal tort immunity
was universal when Holmes wrote in 1897,353 and was the rule in a large
majority of the states when Pound wrote in 1922.354 While in the late
nineteenth century it was no longer legal for husbands to physically
“chastise” their wives,355 courts and lawmakers “routinely condoned
violence in marriage.”356 The rhetoric of privacy and domestic harmony
was used to justify interspousal tort immunity from the late nineteenth
century into the second half of the twentieth century.357
Pound’s description of the olden days of uncontrolled aggression and
the modern days of civilized society explicitly takes men as its model.358
351. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 124, at 1228 (asserting that “accidental injury is what tort law is
really all about”).
352. See Tobias, supra note 36, at 385–422.
353. See id. at 383 (noting that during the period from 1863-1913, judges unanimously rejected
interspousal suits seeking personal injury damages).
354. See id. at 409, 421 (noting that between 1914 and 1920, seven courts rejected interspousal
tort immunity and seven courts affirmed the immunity). A divided Supreme Court upheld interspousal
immunity in the 1910 case of Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). Justice Holmes joined the
dissent of Justice Harlan. The dissent and majority opinions used “cryptic methods” to reach their
results. Tobias, supra note 36, at 401. In the 1920s, the rejection of interspousal tort immunity slowed,
and maintained a very slow pace until it accelerated in the 1970s. See id. at 422.
355. See Siegel, supra note 36, at 2118, 2129–42, 2162–66.
356. See id. at 2130.
357. See id. at 2150–70. This is not to say that women never received tort compensation prior to
the second half of the twentieth century. See Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law
Courts 1860–1930, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79 114–32 (1998) (describing how courts required
common carriers to accommodate physical limitations of female passengers or face liability for
negligence).
358. It is also plausible to conclude that in Pound’s description of “the savage” as opposed to the
“civilized man,” there is a racial subtext of “savage” coding as “black” and “civilized man” coding as
“white.” See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture:
Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1264 (1992) (noting
late nineteenth-century media images of male blacks as brutish and bestial); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape,
Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 108 (1983) (describing late nineteenth-century and
early twentieth-century stereotypes of black males as criminal and bestial). See generally Amy H.
Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal,
and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 280–314 (1994) (describing how white race consciousness
pervades many areas of law although it is not explicitly described as such); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987).
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Pound’s reference to “men of fighting age,”359 for example, can only refer
to males since traditionally in this country only males have officially been
used in combat.360 Similarly, Pound’s reference to the “civilized
man . . . going about his business in a minute division of labor,”361 cannot
plausibly be read as referring both to men and women. When Pound wrote,
women were not generally considered to be in the category of “civilized
[men] . . . going about [their] business.”362 When Pound implied that
intentional torts were vestigial, he did not consider the harm to married
women by their husbands that interspousal immunity and other factors
sheltered from view.363 The idea, expressed by these thinkers in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, that intentional torts were remnants
of the past, only made sense if one did not consider the realities of
interpersonal violence to include domestic violence.
Holmes’s references to intentional torts as being by or against
“neighbors” are other indications of the invisibility of domestic violence.364
He also refers to situations “when A assaults or slanders his neighbor, or
converts his neighbor’s property.”365 These are clearly references to people
outside the home.
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Consistent with these early pronouncements, post World War II torts
scholarship has tended to focus on accidental injury, rather than on
359. POUND, supra note 348, at 169.
360. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding male-only selective service
registration requirement against sex discrimination challenge).
361. POUND, supra note 348, at 169.
362. See id. See also Tobias, supra note 36, at 433 (noting that between the 1920s and the 1940s
“prominent public figures and organs of popular culture persistently reinforced the notion that a
woman’s proper place was in the home”). Of course, the notion that “a woman’s proper place was in
the home” did not apply to black women, who were expected to work outside their homes, but only to
some white women. See generally BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
227–84 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1972); JULIE A. MATTHEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA
94–97, 133–36 (1982).
363. This is not to attribute any malevolence to either Holmes or Pound, but rather simply to
acknowledge the context in which they wrote. Likewise, judges who developed interspousal immunity
doctrines, “[t]hey could well have harbored the good faith conviction that privacy and domestic
harmony were important social values that required protection as they superintended the marriage
relation through a period of turbulent legal transformation.” Siegel, supra note 36, at 2180.
364. HOLMES, supra note 14, at 68. For example, Holmes wrote in THE COMMON LAW that
“[e]very man, it is said, has an absolute right to his person, and so forth, free from detriment at the
hands of his neighbors.” Id.
365. Id. at 63.
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intentional torts.366 Reflecting this focus, the introduction to the discussion
draft of the 1999 Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts declares that
“[t]he problem of accidental injury is what many see as the core problem
facing modern tort law.”367 Intentional torts are peripheral to much torts
scholarship.368 Similarly, despite the persistent problem of domestic
violence and the abolition of interspousal immunity, Holmes’s assumptions
about torts and neighbors continue in recent scholarship. For example,
David Owen wrote in 1995 that “[t]he law of torts concerns the obligations
of persons living in a crowded society to respect the safety, property, and
personality of their neighbors.”369 The idea that family members cause
harm to each other still is not included in the overarching conception of
what constitutes “tort law.” The unstated assumptions of torts scholars
seem to be that the doctrines of intentional torts are robust and not in need
of further exploration or development, that intentional torts occur less
frequently than in the past, or that these torts should be dealt with by
criminal law rather than torts.370
366. See infra text accompanying notes 367–82.
367. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, at xxi.
368. See generally Grey, supra note 124 (noting that many torts scholars consider accidental
injury to be the primary domain of torts). There is some recent scholarship concerning intentional torts,
such as a substantial body of scholarship arguing that racial insults and epithets should be compensable
under intentional infliction of emotional distress theories. See, e.g., MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R.
LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Okianer Christian
Dark, Racial Insults: “Keep Thy Tongue From Evil,” 24 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 559 (1990); Richard
Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). Others have argued for application of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress tort to new contexts. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker
Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988);
Susan Etta Keller, Does the Roof Have to Cave In?: The Landlord/Tenant Power Relationship and the
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (1988). In addition, some more
general scholarship has treated intentional torts as centrally important. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton,
Rules and Relationships: The Varieties of Wrongdoing in Tort Law, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 359
(1997) (developing relational approach to tort liability). This is not intended to be a comprehensive list
of twentieth-century torts scholarship dealing with intentional torts.
369. OWEN, supra note 16, at 7 (emphasis added).
370. Economic analysis of tort law has focussed primarily on accidents rather than intentional
torts; in some instances, tort law is implicitly or explicitly defined as law concerning the problem of
accidental injury. See, e.g., BARNES & STOUT, supra note 123, at 27 (stating that the economic analysis
of tort law deals with determining risk of loss created by activities that result in accidental personal
injuries or destruction of property); CALABRESI, supra note 124; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 124, at
429 (stating that tort law concerns accidental harm and criminal law concerns intentional harm);
Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort Theory, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 59, 61
(1999) (criticizing corrective justice scholars for not dealing with “the problem of accidental injury”).
See generally Grey, supra note 124 (noting widespread perception that tort law is primarily about
accidents). Richard Posner’s ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992), for example, devotes about

2001]

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TORTS

183

The general fact that compensation for injuries caused by intentional
acts is less likely than compensation for accidentally caused injury is well
known.371 It is perplexing that torts scholarship ignores the disparity or
accepts it as “somewhat ironic[],” while acknowledging that intentional
torts are “considerably more serious” than negligence.372 If one defines the
central problem of torts as the problem of accidental injury, one excludes
vast realms of human experience from close analysis. The most common
cause of nonfatal injury to women in the United States373 is placed at the
periphery of torts. The torts that are the most serious and reprehensible374
are treated as the least important.
Since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, major changes in
family law and in the law related to women’s status have taken place.
Interspousal tort immunity is virtually dead.375 Divorce is now widely
available.376 Marriage rates have declined significantly in the past several
six pages to intentional torts and forty-six pages to the rest of torts. Some of the material on nonintentional torts relates to intentional torts also, such as material on causation, but the main focus is on
non-intentional torts. See POSNER, supra note 12. William Landes and Richard Posner’s THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) covers intentional torts in 41 pages out of 316 pages. See
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12. Interestingly, Cooter & Ulen subsume intentional torts into crimes
because of a perceived similarity between the two. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 124, at 288–89;
while Posner conflates many intentional torts with negligence because of the economic similarity
between the two. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 206–08. Law and economics has not ignored
intentional torts, but intentional torts have not been a central focus. Economic theories have had great
influence in tort scholarship. See OWEN, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that by the early 1980s, “the
economic theorists’ utility and efficiency-based approaches . . . had become entrenched as the dominant
theoretical [tort] scholarship of the time”). Corrective justice, which sees tort law as “a means of
rectifying wrongful losses, not inefficient exchanges,” has not had intentional torts as a central focus.
See id. at 5. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 28; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW
(1995). But see John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in OWEN, supra note 16, at 233–37, 242–47
(criticizing Posner’s analysis of intentional torts as incoherent and as inappropriately applying
utilitarian analysis to normative issues); Epstein, supra note 28, at 391–92.
371. As the Restatement states:
[s]omewhat ironically—given that intentional torts are deemed considerably more serious
than torts of mere negligence—in certain circumstances the plaintiff is worse off if the tort
committed against the plaintiff is classified as intentional rather than negligent. In some
jurisdictions, for example, the statute of limitations is shorter for intentional torts than for
negligent torts . . . . The plaintiff may expect to collect an eventual judgment from the
defendant’s insurance policy, and that policy may exclude coverage for intentional torts;
accordingly, the plaintiff can be worse off if the tort is intentional rather than negligent.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 28 § 1 cmt.a.
372. See id.
373. See text accompanying supra note 1.
374. The Restatement introductory draft notes that “intentional torts are deemed considerably
more serious than torts of mere negligence.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 1a. See supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
375. See Tobias, supra note 36, at 478.
376. See generally, GLENDON, supra note 145, at 63–111 (examining U.S. and European divorce
law).
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decades.377 Domestic violence has come to light and continues to be much
discussed.378
One might expect that the abrogation of interspousal tort immunity
and the societal recognition of domestic violence, which opens up new
realms of harm to analysis, would have prompted some reflection among
mainstream tort scholars about tort issues involving domestic violence. But
this largely has not happened. A limited legal literature discusses torts of
domestic violence, but sustained attention to issues such as deterrence or
compensation related to such torts largely is lacking.379 Twenty-first
century torts scholarship must acknowledge the problem of domestic
violence torts and should see the problem of domestic violence torts as a
core problem of tort law.
V. CONCLUSION
Common law tort remedies are broad enough to encompass liability
for domestic violence torts. Yet, insurance and torts contain structural
barriers that lead to lack of enforcement. These structural barriers have
largely been taken for granted. This Article has examined many of these
barriers and developed ideas to begin to surmount them.
The myopic focus of twentieth-century torts on accidental harm has
excluded from consideration “the most common cause of nonfatal injury to
women in the United States.”380 Taking that statement as a starting
premise for tort theory, tort scholarship has much work to do. Current torts
and insurance arrangements implicitly consider the problem of domestic
violence torts to be either intractable or unimportant. This problem is
obviously important. Although we do not know whether the problem is
intractable, other seemingly intractable problems like uncompensated harm
from uninsured motorists have been ameliorated. We have only begun to
address, rather than ignore and endorse, harm from domestic violence torts.

377. See Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of
Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 (2000).
378. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 2.
379. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
380. Kyriacou et al., supra note 1, at 1892.

